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STOTTS' DENIAL OF HIRING AND
PROMOTION PREFERENCES FOR NON-




With the exception of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,' no legal topic in recent years has prompted
as much heated discussion in every stratum of American society as
affirmative action. 2 It has been a particularly nettlesome problem
in the context of labor relations. White and blue collar workers,
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., 1972,
Fordham University School of Law; LL.M., 1978, New York University School of
Law; Chief, Civil Division, Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, 1981-1983. While serving as an Assistant United States Attor-
ney, Professor Daly was trial counsel to the defendants in Fullilove v. Klutznick
and participated extensively in drafting the government's brief on appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. In general, "affirmative action" means "those actions appropriate to over-
come the effects of past or present practices, policies, or other barriers to equal
employment opportunity." EEOC Guidelines, Affirmative Action Appropriate Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1985). Such
actions include training plans and programs, recruiting activity, elimination of any
adverse impact caused by selection criteria not validated pursuant to EEOC Guide-
lines, and modification of promotion and layoff procedures. Id. § 1608.3(c); see
also OFCCP, Affirmative Action Programs, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1 to -2.32 (1985).
This Article addresses one aspect of affirmative action, i.e., preference in hiring
or promotions given to identified victims of employment discrimination on account
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin or to non-victims who share the
"offending" characteristic that triggered the employer's conduct. The beneficiaries
of this preference obtain it as a result of a judgment following trial, a judgment
entered upon the parties' consent or a voluntary agreement. For a description of
typical affirmative action provisions, see infra notes 29, 90 and accompanying text.
The term itself was "expressly modeled" on section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). 49 Stat. 454 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1982)); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 & n.1l (1975). Under
this statute, however, relief is limited to actual victims and generally consists of
back pay and a monitoring of the employer's compliance with an order prohibiting
future violations. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he prin-
ciples developed under the NLRA generally guide, but do not bind, courts in
tailoring remedies under Title VII." Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226
n.8 (1982) (citing International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
366-67 (1977)); see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 768-70 (1976);
Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 419 & n.ll.
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managers, personnel officers and professionals in both the private
and public sector have sharply debated its merits.' Scholars and
jurists have taken no less dispassionate views on this topic than the
general population. 4 One of the few areas of agreement between
affirmative action proponents and opponents concerns the appro-
priateness of compensation for actual victims of discrimination. This
agreement rests on shared concepts of fair play and evenhandedness-
two fundamental principles of American jurisprudence. In their com-
mon view, employment or promotion preferences, back pay, con-
structive seniority and other similar forms of relief are permissible
when designed to "make-whole" an aggrieved applicant or employee.5
3. Compare Affirmative Retreat, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1985, at E24, col. 1;
Why Torpedo Justice in Jobs?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1985, at 22, col. 1; Bok,
Admitting Success, 192 NEW REPUBLIC 14-16 (Feb. 4, 1985); Negative Action, 238
NATION 788-89 (June 30, 1984); Wilkins, Cops and Quotas, 237 NATION 652-53
(Dec. 24, 1983); with Brown III, Problems In "Reverse Discrimination": A Man-
agement View, 32 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 239 (1980); Cohen, Why Racial Preference
Is Illegal and Immoral, 67-68 COMMENTARY 40-44 (June 1979); Mosak, Affirmative
Action Si-Quotas No, 9 EMPL. REL. L.J. 126 (1983); Sowell, Myths About Mi-
norities, 68 COMMENTARY 33 (Aug. 1979); Quotas, Again-And Again, And Again
... 37 NAT'L REV. 14 (May 31, 1985); Reverse Discrimination-and Politics, 35
NAT'L REV. 1589 (Dec. 23, 1983).
4. Compare Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Dis-
crimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Edwards & Zaretsky];
Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
723 (1974); Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 87 (1979); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Pref-
erences in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975); Kaplan, Equal
Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action
and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); with N. GLASSER, AFFIRMATIVE
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); B. GROSS, DIS-
CRIMINATION IN REVERSE: Is TURNABOUT FAIR PLAY? (1978); R. O'NEIL, DISCRIM-
INATION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION (1975); Posner, The Bakke Case and the Future
of "Affirmative Action", 67 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1979); Posner, The DeFunis Case
and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup.
CT. REV. 1; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Respon-
sibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Seeburger, A Heuristic
Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 285 (1977); Van
Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979).
5. The Supreme Court has squarely held that actual victims should be restored
to their "rightful place," that is, the "position where they would have been were
it not for the unlawful discrimination." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 764 (1976) (citation omitted); accord Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 421 (1975). But it has also tempered the admonition by emphasizing that
the courts must respect the legitimate interests of " 'innocent third parties'." Ford
Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239 (1982) (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 723 (1978)); see also International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 371-76 (1977).
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Why then is affirmative action so controversial and hotly debated?
In large measure, it is because employers and courts frequently have
not limited positive employment benefits to identified victims of
discrimination. They have extended the benefits to non-victims solely
because the latter share the offending characteristics which triggered
the original discrimination-such as race, religion, color, sex or
national origin. 6 It is at the point of preference for non-victims that
affirmative action proponents and opponents part company.
The debate surrounding this aspect of affirmative action recently
intensified as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Firefighters
Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts.7 That case involved the propriety
of a district court's interpretion of a consent decree entered under
the authority of title VII (Title VII) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(the 1964 Act),8 to enjoin the application of a seniority system in order
to preserve the recent employment gains of minority firefighters at the
expense of non-minority firefighters with greater seniority. In deciding
that issue, however, the Court made very pointed references in dicta
to the narrow scope of affirmative relief available to non-victims
under Title VII.9 It strongly suggested that Title VII strictly limited
"make-whole" relief to identified victims of discrimination. 0 Non-
victims could only benefit indirectly, as a result of court orders
which mandated greater minority employee recruitment efforts and
granted general injunctive relief against future statutory violations."
6. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Chisholm
v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v.
City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1359-62 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Firefighters
Inst. For Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 364 (8th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d
1358, 1362-67 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625
F.2d 918, 944 (10th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d
167, 174-77 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Boston Chapter,
NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 501
F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. I.B.E.W.,
Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 150-52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
For a stimulating examination of employment discrimination from the "victim
perspective" analyzed by a proponent of the school of Critical Legal Studies, see
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978).
7. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241,
253-66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
9. 104 S. Ct. 2581, (White, J.); id. at 2590-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 2588-90 (White, J.); id. at 2592-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. Id.
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Stotts intimates that "goals," "timetables," and "quotas," the stock
devices routinely used by courts in ordering relief after trial and by
defendants and plaintiffs in drafting consent decrees, are no longer
available. 12
The radical impact such a holding would have on Title VII litigation
12. These devices have been the key structural elements in most Title VII
judgments and consent decrees. Furthermore, as Justice Blackmun pointed out in
Stotts, the courts of appeals have unanimously held that extending quota relief to
non-victims is appropriate to remedy Title VII violations. 104 S. Ct. at 2606 n.10
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 294 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 499 (4th Cir.
1981); United States v. City of Chicago, 663 F.2d 1354, 1359-62 (7th Cir. 1981)
(en banc); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d
350, 364 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); United States v. City
of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1363-66 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 944 (10th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-77 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978);
Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638,
501 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 553-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United States v. I.B.E.W.,
Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 151-52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
Other cases in which courts have approved the use of quota relief for non-
victims include: McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 79-80 (D.C. Cir. 1982); EEOC
v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809, 813-14 (8th Cir. 1979); Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1342-44 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot,
440 U.S. 625 (1979); EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 565
F.2d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. International Union of Elevator Con-
structors, Local 5, 538 F.2d 1012, 1017-20 (3d Cir. 1976); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530
F.2d 431, 434 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Arnold v. Ballard, 12
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1613, 1614 (6th Cir. 1976); Vulcan Soc'y of New York
City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. New Jersey, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1716, 1719 (D.N.J. 1980);
Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 21 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1120, 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Drayton
v. City of St. Petersburg, 477 F. Supp. 846, 860-61 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Hill v. Western
Elec. Co., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1157, 1164 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 596 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 929 (1979); Stamps
v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 122-23 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd in relevant
part sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339
F. Supp. 1108, 1124-25 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.
1973). See Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Association Against Discrimination in Employ-
ment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 278-86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 988 (1982); see also Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 4, at 25-31; Slate,
Preferential Relief in Employment Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 315,
317-21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Slate]; Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII,
65 VA. L. REV. 729, 731-33 (1979); 1974-75 Annual Survey of Labor Relations and
Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 965 (1975). See
generally UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE
1980's: DISMANTLING THE PROCESS OF DISCRIMINATION 21-23 (1981).
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has caused this author to analyze three issues: (1) whether the Stotts
dicta are consistent with the Court's analysis in Bakke, 3 Fullilove4
and Weber;5 (2) whether the majority's interpretation of the leg-
islative history of Title VII correctly divines Congress' intent; and
(3) whether the Court's endorsement of class certifications pursuant
to Rule 23(b)(2) 6 and of the use of statistical evidence to establish
a prima facie violation of Title VII is consistent with limiting race-
conscious relief to identified victims of discrimination.
As set forth below, the analysis of these issues has prompted
serious reservations about Stotts' restrictions on relief for- non-vic-
tims. These reservations spring from a constellation of concerns
which the Court either ignores outright or treats shabbily." As a
The majority of cases approving the use of quotas involve government employers-
perhaps because of "public policy considerations . . . not present in private em-
ployment." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1402 (2d ed.
1983) [hereinafter cited as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].
Although their use has been uniformly approved, the courts have been less than
enthusiastic about their imposition partly because they fly in the face of our "color-
blind" concept of equality and partly because they can exacerbate racial tensions.
The latter concern has manifested itself particularly in cases involving quotas as
a remedy for discrimination in promotion (as opposed to hiring). E.g., Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
940 (1981); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d
420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); see Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976);
Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 965 (1977). But see Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis,
616 F.2d 350, 364 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); United States
v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 429 (7th Cir. 1978), vacated, 663 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir. 1981) (en banc); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-
77 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Reed v. Lucas, 11 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 153, 156 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
13. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
15. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
16. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b) ("lain action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition . . . (2) the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding de-
claratory relief with respect to the class as a whole").
17. The Court will have an opportunity to respond to these concerns during
the 1985-86 Term. Three cases on its docket raise Stotts-related issues regarding
relief for non-victims. In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985), the question before the Court
is whether the fourteenth amendment prohibits a school board and a union from
voluntarily modifying a seniority system to provide that, in the event of a layoff,
the percentage of minority teachers may not exceed the current percentage of
minority personnel at the time of the layoff. In Vanguards v. City of Cleveland,
753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985),
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threshold matter, there is the fundamental issue of the Court's
selection of Stotts as the vehicle to express its views on the nature
of appropriate relief under Title VII. To decide the issue of the
propriety of the lower court's injunction it was not necessary to
reach the general issue of "individual" versus "group" relief. Stotts
represents a highly disturbing disregard by the Court for the principle
of self-restraint.
On the merits, the Stotts dicta are fundamentally flawed by their
neglect of the Court's prior affirmative action jurisprudence. In
Weber, the Court held that a private agreement awarding positive
employment benefits to non-victims, based solely on their race, did
not violate Title VII.'" It rested that decision on a broad reading
of the Act's legislative history, emphasizing Congress' intent to bring
blacks into the mainstream of American economic life.' 9 Given that
intent it seems highly unlikely that Congress would have allowed
private employers to use such remedies while denying their use to
courts. The dicta in Stotts severely disadvantage minority workers
whose employers have been found by a court to have engaged in
prohibited conduct. They similarly disadvantage minority workers
whose employers have sought the protection of a consent judgment.
Moreover, dicta in Bakke and Fullilove suggest that a court's remedial
power under Title VII does not limit race-conscious relief to identified
victims.20
The legislative history of the 1964 Act and the 1972 Amendments
casts further doubt on the correctness of Stotts dicta. The Court's
approach to the legislative history is conceptually faulty because it
isolates Title VII from the remainder of the statute. In interpreting
Congress' intent, the Court should take an organic approach rather
than dissect the Act, title by title. The majority opinion, moreover,
places excessive reliance on references to the "individual victim of
the question is whether a municipality acts consistently with Title VII when entering
into a consent decree providing quota-type relief in promotions to non-victims. In
EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985), the question is whether a
court can order quota-type relief for union admission as a remedy for contempt
if a union has engaged in longstanding and egregious racial discrimination.
If the Court decides in Wygant that the fourteenth amendment prohibits race-
conscious preferential relief for non-victims, that decision may moot Vanguards
depending upon the breadth of the Court's opinion. The issue of quota-type relief
for non-victims would remain a live one, however, since the fourteenth amendment
does not apply to private employers.
18. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
19. Id. at 202-07.
20. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482-89 (1980); Regents of the Univ.




discrimination" which appear throughout the legislative history of
the 1964 Act and in parts of the legislative history of the 1972
Amendments. 2 "Individual" relief is not inconsistent with "group"
relief. Th.e legislators were hampered by the absence of legal ter-
minology to convey their approval of this form of relief. 22 When
they were specifically given the opportunity, in 1972, to prohibit
race-conscious relief for non-victims, they overwhelmingly rejected
the opportunity. 23
Adding to these weaknesses is the Court's endorsement of certain
procedural and evidentiary mechanisms in Title VII litigation. 24 In
reviewing the propriety of Rule 23(b)(2) certifications, the Court has
endorsed the principle that racial discrimination is, by definition, a
group wrong. Similarly, its approval of the use of statistical evidence
to establish a prima facie case points to the non-individualized nature
of the injury.
In light of the foregoing, the author concludes that the Stotts
dicta are seriously flawed and should be reconsidered. As further
support for this conclusion, there is offered a brief description of
the jurisprudential considerations justifying affirmative relief for non-
victims.25
I. The Stotts Decision
The Stotts case began in 1977 as a class action alleging that
Memphis officials engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
against black applicants and employees in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.26 Following three years of discovery,
the parties entered into a consent judgment.2 7 The relief afforded
reflected the common dualism inherent in most Title VII actions:
specific remedies were ordered for named individuals and "class-
based" relief was ordered for non-victims." The consent decree was
silent with respect to seniority rights. Not surprisingly, it contained
no admission of discrimination by the city.29
21. See infra notes 211-24, 229-54, 268-82 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 367-79 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 229-54 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 285-367 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 368-95 and accompanying text.
26. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2581 (1984).
27. Id.
28. Thirteen black firefighters received promotions and 81 received back pay
and the city agreed to a 50% hiring goal and a 20% promotion goal. Id.
29. The consent decree is reproduced as an appendix to the court of appeals
decision in Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 573-79 (6th Cir. 1982).
It contained standard language explicitly stating the "[diefendants, by entering into
19861
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The city's income did not keep pace with its expenses and, in
1981, it announced its intention to lay off non-essential municipal
employees. The city's collective bargaining agreement with the fire-
fighters' union contained a standard "last hired, first fired" provision
and, therefore, the layoffs would have had a substantially dispro-
portionate effect on recently hired black firefighters. In response to
a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court enjoined
the layoffs, insofar as they would result in diminishing the percentage
of black firefighters.30 Compliance with the injunction resulted in
at least three white employees being laid off while three blacks with
less seniority were retained. The minority firefighters who benefitted
from the injunction were not themselves specific victims of any
discriminatory practices.3
The district court's rationale was far from crystal clear.32 Although
it specifically found that the city and union adopted the seniority
system without any intent to discriminate, it concluded that, because
of the system's discriminatory impact, it was not a bona fide system
within the meaning of section 703(h).3  While the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit disagreed with this conclusion, it affirmed the
district court's issuance of the preliminary injunction on two alter-
native grounds.3 4 Initially, it analyzed the settlement agreement as
a contract, characterizing the proposed layoffs as "breach" of the
city's obligation to increase substantially the number of blacks in
supervisory positions. 5 Under this theory, the district court properly
enjoined the city's potential breach of its contractual obligation.
Alternatively, it held that, since new and unforeseen circumstances
created a hardship for the class members, the district court possessed
inherent authority to modify the consent judgment.3 6 It flatly rejected
this Consent Decree, do not thereby admit any violations of law, rule, or regulation
with respect to the allegations made by plaintiffs in their complaints." Id. at 574.
See generally, Preparation and Management of Affirmative Action Program, I EMPL.
PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 1 1390-1439; Sample Agreements and Information Sources,
id. at 1485 (sample consent decree). Another typical decree is reprinted as an
appendix in United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1342-51 (5th Cir.
1980), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam).
30. 104 S. Ct. at 2582.
31. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 549-51 (6th Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
32. No. 79-2441, slip op. at 1-5 (W.D. Tenn. May 8, 1981).
33. Id. at 2. Section 703(h) states: "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system ......
34. 679 F.2d at 556-57.
35. Id. at 561-62.
36. Id. at 562-64.
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the city and union's argument that modification infringed upon the
protection extended by section 703(h).37
The first issue addressed by the Supreme Court was mootness.
Stotts rested this claim on the fact that all the white employees laid
off as a result of the district court's preliminary injunction had
returned to work one month later and that the demoted employees
were reoffered their old positions.38 Since the majority rejected that
contention, an extended analysis of that argument is unwarranted.
It may be noted in passing, however, that the mootness issue was
a close one. Both the majority and dissenting opinions marshalled
an impressive array of facts and legal authorities in support of their
respective positions.3 9 Since the arguments in favor of mootness were
weighty, one can fairly infer that the majority was particularly eager
to reach the seniority/layoff issue.40
Justice White, writing the majority opinion in which Justices
Burger, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined, 4' rejected both the
contract theory and the inherent jurisdiction theory articulated by
the Sixth Circuit. With respect to the contract theory, he found the
consent decree's silence on the question of modifications in the
seniority system to be persuasive. Since layoffs and seniority mod-
ifications were not issues dealt with in the "settlement contract,"
there was no basis upon which to issue an order enjoining the alleged
breach .42
As for the district court's inherent authority to modify the consent
decree, the majority held that such modification conflicted with the
broad protection extended by Congress in section 703(h) for bona
fide seniority systems.4 3 Following this conclusion the decision veers
off into a discussion of the limited scope of relief available under
37. Id. at 564-66.
38. 104 S. Ct. at 2583.
39. Compare 104 S. Ct. at 2583-85 (White, J.) and id. at 2590-92 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) with id. at 2596-602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Indeed, the year before, the Court had granted certiorari in a case with
the identical issue, but dismissed the case as moot without reaching the merits.
Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (lst Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded for consideration of mootness sub nom. Boston Firefighters Union, Local
718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (mootness issue arose because of
"changed circumstances" brought about by subsequent state legislation), vacated
as moot sub nom. Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 716 F.2d 931 (1st Cir.
1983). On review for a second time, the Court in a 5-3 vote ordered the First
Circuit to reconsider its holding in light of Stotts. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). On
remand, the court of appeals reaffirmed its judgment vacating the district court's
order on the ground of mootness. 749 F.2d 102, 103-04 (1st Cir. 1984).
41. 104 S. Ct. 2576.
42. Id. at 2586.
43. Id. at 2586-87.
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Title VII."1 Why Justice White felt compelled to include this analysis
is not at all clear. The rejection of the Sixth Circuit's rationale was
certainly sufficient to vacate the injunction.
In the view of the majority opinion, Congress limited a court's
remedial authority to providing "make-whole relief only to those
who have been actual victims of illegal discrimination. ' 4, Similarly,
Justice O'Connor, in a separate concurring opinion, wrote, "a court
may use its remedial powers ... only to prevent future violations
and to compensate identified victims of unlawful discrimination." ' 46
Both opinions cite the Act's legislative history and earlier Title VII
cases decided by the Court to support these propositions. 47
The Stotts dicta provoked sharp debate, among both the Justices
themselves and other members of the legal community. Justice Ste-
vens, although concurring in the judgment, labelled the Court's
discussion of Title VII "wholly advisory." ' 4 His opinion forcefully
objected to the majority's statements, and observed "[tihis case
involves no issue under Title VII; it only involves the administration
of a consent decree." ' 49 In a speech delivered at the dedication of
a new building at Northwestern University Law School in August,
44. Id. at 2588-90.
45. Id. at 2589. A foreshadowing of the Court's new emphasis may be found
in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), in which the Court held that an
employer's use of a written test having a discriminatory impact on minority employees
in the promotion process constituted a prima facie violation of Title VII even
though the employer's "bottom line" statistics reflected the racial composition of
the labor pool. The majority opinion emphasized Title VII's overriding statutory
goal of protecting the "individual employee." Id. at 453-56. For criticism of the
Teal holding, see generally Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment
Discrimination, and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 99 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen]; Irvin, Erasing the "Bottom
Line": Connecticut v. Teal, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 175 (1983). But see Rigler,
Connecticut v. Teal: The Supreme Court's Latest Exposition of Disparate Impact
Analysis, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Rigler]. For
reasons which are not readily apparent, neither Justice White nor Justice O'Connor
cited Teal in Stotts. The Justices relied principally on Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), and International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977). Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2584-94; see infra note 382.
Stotts may also represent simply more "backpedaling" along the lines of Beazer
v. New York Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567 (1978); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); and Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See Kreiling & Mercurio, Beyond Weber: The
Broadening Scope of Judicial Approval of Affirmative Action, 88 DICK. L. REV.
46, 54 n.42 (1983); see also infra note 87; Cox, The Question of "Voluntary"
Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 88, 141 (1981).
46. 104 S. Ct. at 2593.
47. Id. at 2588-89 (White, J., majority), 2591-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




1984, Justice Stevens criticized the Court for reaching out to address
the issue.5 0
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, filed
a vigorous dissent in Stotts in which he addressed the propriety of
non-individualized "race conscious" affirmative relief." The dissent
focused on the case's procedural posture, emphasizing that the dispute
arose in the context of administering a consent decree and resolving
a motion for a preliminary injunction. Relying on the legislative
history of Title VII as enacted in 1964 and amended in 1972, Justice
Blackmun endorsed relief for non-victims as a means of eradicating
the class-wide effects of prior discrimination. 2  He reasoned that
injury to a group required group-structured relief. 3
The controversy, sparked by the discussion of Title VII remedies
in the Stotts opinion, immediately spilled over into other Title VII
litigation. The Civil Rights Unit of the Department of Justice, which
had filed an amicus curiae brief in Stotts,'4 seized upon the language
in the majority and concurring opinions and filed briefs in several
public employment cases arguing that relief to non-victims violates
the statute."5 To date, this position has been consistently rejected by
the circuit courts and the district courts, which have interpreted Stotts
very narrowly.
5 6
50. Address by Justice John Paul Stevens, Dedication of the Arthur Rubloff
Building, Northwestern University School of Law (Aug. 4, 1984). Justice Stevens'
comments received front page attention. N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1984, at Al, col.
1.
51. 104 S. Ct. at 2605-10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2608-10.
53. Id.
54. As amicus, the Department of Justice urged the Court to reverse the court
of appeals' decision on the ground that section 703(h) protected the seniority system
between the Memphis Fire Department and the union. In its brief, the Department
forcefully emphasized its view that under Title VII a court cannot order relief to
anyone other than a specific victim of discrimination. Brief for the United States
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, 11, 23-29, Firefighters Local No.
1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
55. The Department has aggressively pursued this position, referring to what
are obviously dicta in Justices White's and O'Connor's opinions as the case's
holding. The Department has filed briefs in several cases, urging the courts of
appeals to reverse the granting of quota-type relief for non-victims. E.g., Reply
Brief for the United States at 2-10, Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (lth Cir.
1985), aff'g 580 F. Supp. 171 (M.D. Ala. 1983); see N.Y. Times, July 18, 1984,
at B8, col. 1 (in arguing before Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attorneys
for Department of Justice contended "the judge's order 'is precisely the sort of
racial quota that the [Stotts] Court found impermissible.' ")
In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted,
105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985), the Department has also argued analogously that race-
conscious affirmative relief for non-victims violates the fourteenth amendment. See
supra note 17.
56. E.g., Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817, 823-26 (lth Cir. 1985); Vanguards of
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II. The Statute Itself
A. A Brief Description
Essentially, Title VII prohibits an employer from considering an
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin in making
any decision related to the compensation, terms or conditions or
privileges of employment.17 Title VII not only prohibits an employer
from treating his employees differently based on these characteristics,
but it also prohibits employment practices which have a disparate
impact. 8 Similar prohibitions are applicable to employment agencies
and labor unions.5 9
Two specific provisions of Title VII are pertinent to determining
the scope of a court's remedial power. The first is section 706(g),
which provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged
in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 485-89 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985); EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172, 1185-86 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3223
(U.S. Oct. 8, 1985); Van Aken v. Young, 750 F.2d 43, 44-45 (6th Cir. 1984);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1157-59 (6th Cir. 1984), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739
F.2d 894, 909-11 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 782 (1985); Deveraux v.
Geary, 596 F. Supp. 1481, 1485-87 (D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir.
1985); Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1228-
31 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985); NAACP v. Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1194, 1202-03 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 253 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)). Subsection (e) of section 703 carves
out an exception if "religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the] particular business
or enterprise." Id. § 703(e) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982)).
In addition, the statute specifically excludes from its coverage the employment
of aliens outside the United States and permits a religious corporation, association,
educational institution or society to discriminate solely on the basis of religion.
Id. § 702 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l).
58. See supra notes 74-89, 338-46 and accompanying text. "Disparate treatment"
cases generally turn on proof of an employer's conscious motive; whereas "disparate
impact" cases deal with practices which appear neutral but affect one group more
severely than another. The employer's good faith motivation is irrelevant in the
latter type of case. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 335-37 n.15 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422-23(1975); see also Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978). Compare
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-06 (1973) with Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, supra
note 45; Rigler, supra note 45.
59. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(b), (c), 78 Stat. 255
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b), (c) (1982)).
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charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate . . . No order of the court shall require
the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of
a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual
as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was
refused employment or advancement or was suspended or dis-
charged for any reason other than discrimination on account of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of
section 2000e-3(a) of this title.60
The second provision is section 7030) which states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee ... to grant preferential treatment
to any individual or to any group because of the race ... of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race ... employed by any employer, referred or classified for
employment by any employment agency or labor organization,
admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization,
or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other
training program, in comparison with the total number or per-
centage of persons of such race ... in any community, State,
section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area.,"
The problem posed by these two provisions is their precise rela-
tionship to one another. section 7030) does not contain a blanket
prohibition against preferential treatment to correct a racial imbalance
between an employer's work force and the appropriate labor market. 62
It simply states that nothing in Title VII requires preferential treat-
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). "Intentionally" does not refer to motive and has
generally been interpreted to mean "not accidentally." See, e.g., Schaeffer v. San
Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. General
Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359-60 (5th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
62. For ease of reference, this Article will address discrimination on the basis
of race. Unless otherwise indicated, however, its analysis is equally applicable to
discrimination based on any of the other outlawed characteristics (i.e., color, religion,
sex, national origin).
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ment. On the other hand, section 706(g) on its face appears to deny
a court the power to order relief to an individual under Title VII
in the absence of a discriminatory act specifically affecting that
individual.
Three theories have been suggested to reconcile the two provisions.
63
According to the "violation" theory, section 7030) precludes a court
from finding a violation of Title VII based only on an employer's
failure to correct voluntarily any racial imbalance existing in its
work force. 64 However, once a court finds a Title VII violation
based on disparate treatment or adverse impact, section 706(g) vests
the court with a full panoply of equitable powers, including the
ordering of preferential relief for non-victims. 65 It is difficult to
square this theory with the actual wording of that provision pro-
hibiting a court from ordering relief "for any reason other than
discrimination on account of race .... ,,66 The legislative history of
section 706(g) suggests, however, that Congress did not intend for
this language to be taken at face value.
67
The "remedy" theory argues precisely the opposite interpretation.
It views section 7030) as a direct limitation on a court's powers. 68
This interpretation has never gained broad judicial acceptance, al-
though it has been articulated on occasion in dissenting and con-
curring opinions. 69
63. Note, Preferential Relief Under Title VII, 65 VA. L. REV. 729, 733-37 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Preferential Relief]; see Comment, Affirmative Relief Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 373, 374-87 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Affirmative Reliej]; see also Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note
4, at 25-28; Sape, The Use of Numerical Quotas to Achieve Integration in Em-
ployment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 481, 496-500 (1975).
64. Preferential Relief, supra note 63, at 733-34; Slate, supra note 12, at 331.
65. United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local Union
No. 5, 538 F.2d' 1012, 1018-20 (3d Cir. 1976); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,
328-29 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States
v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
66. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)); see supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
67. See infra notes 212-54 and accompanying text; Preferential Relief, supra
note 63 at 737-59; EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 174-77 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); United States v. International Union
of Elevator Constructors, Local Union No. 5, 538 F.2d 1012, 1019-20 (3d Cir.
1976); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1976); King v. Laborers
lnt'l Union, Union Local No. 818, 443 F.2d 273, 278-79 (6th Cir. 1971); see also
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social
Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
68. Preferential Relief, supra note 63, at 734-35.
69. See, e.g., Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 501
F.2d 622, 634-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (Hays, J., dissenting) ("under no circumstance
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The most popular theory is the "hybrid," in which section 7030)
is viewed as having both remedial and substantive implications. In
other words, mere racial imbalance is not per se conclusive proof
of discrimination 70 and, accordingly, cannot be the sole basis upon
which relief is granted. If there is evidence of discrimination, how-
ever, the court is ordering preferential treatment for reasons not
"on account of an imbalance."'" Members of the group discriminated
against are entitled to relief regardless of specific discriminatory acts
directed at them. Some commentators have criticized this theory,
arguing that section 7030) is superfluous if Congress merely intended
to withdraw Title VII as a statutory source for requiring employers
to remedy racial imbalance in the absence of prohibited discrimi-
natory practices. To these commentators, section 706(g) makes it
crystal clear that a court may not order individual relief in the
absence of proof of unlawful discrimination directed at that indi-
vidual.72
The problem with this criticism is that it overlooks the tumultuous
legislative history of the statute. It would be nice-but naive, given
the political upheaval surrounding Title VII's passage-to assume
that Congress drafted the various sections of the statute to fit neatly
together and, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, to make a harmonious
composition-each section being logically related to the other.73
does Title VII require or authorize the imposition of racial employment quotas as
a remedial device"); United States v. International Ass'n of Operating Engineers,
Local Union No. 701, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1400 (D. Or. 1977); see
also Local Union No. 35, IBEW v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416, 425-29 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981);
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 276-77 (4th Cir.) (Widener,
J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Carson v. American
Brands, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 780, 784-87 (E.D. Va. 1977), appeal dismissed, 606
F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 79 (1981); Price v. Civil Service Comm'n,
26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Mosk, J., dissenting), cert.
dismissed, 449 U.S. 811 (1980).
70. Preferential Relief, supra note 63, at 735-37; Edwards & Zaretsky, supra
note 4, at 27-28; see United States v. IBEW, Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-,
52 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); accord Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n
Steamfitters Local 638 of U.A., 501 F.2d 622, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1974); United States
v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers
v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051-53 (5th Cir. 1969).
71. United States v. IBEW, Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir.) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1964)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Preferential Relief,
supra note 63, at 735-36.
72. Preferential Relief, supra note 63, at 747; Affirmative Relief, supra note
63, at 383-84.
73. Senator Dirksen has been quoted as saying: "1 doubt very much whether
in my whole legislative lifetime any measure has received so much meticulous
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B. Title VII Litigation: An Overview
In order to put the problem posed by sections 706(g) and 7030)
in sharper focus, familiarity with the two general kinds of Title VII
litigation is required. 74 In a "disparate treatment" case, a private
plaintiff sues either on his own behalf or on behalf of a class,
claiming the employer treated some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.75
The proof offered directly concerns the plaintiff and the employer's
motives and often consists of anecdotal evidence such as conver-
sations with the employer, a supervisor or co-workers. Frequently,
this proof is supplemented with statistical or other generalized in-
formation showing that the employer has treated others similarly
situated to the plaintiff in a like discriminatory manner.76
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of burden of proof in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,7  holding that a prima facie
case of racial discrimination exists when a plaintiff shows:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the
complainant's qualifications.7"
If the plaintiff presents such proof, the burden of going forward
with the evidence shifts to the employer; the employer must show
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the rejection. If the em-
attention. We have tried to be mindful of every word, of every comma, and of
the shading of every phrase." 110 CONG. REC. 11,935 (1964). This comment reeks
of the hyperbole for which the Senator was renowned. Moreover, it ignores the
political climate and the fact that last minute changes were made in the political
hurly-burly in order to guarantee the statute's passage. See infra notes 198-201 and
accompanying text.
74. For a comprehensive analysis of the disparate treatment and adverse impact
theories of employment discrimination, see Schlei & Grossman, supra note 12, at
1286-1394. See generally Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case
in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1979).
75. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23
(1977). See generally Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination
Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Heyman v. Tetra Plastics Corp., 640 F.2d 115, 120-21 (8th Cir.
1981); Underwood v. Jefferson Memorial Hosp., 639 F.2d 455, 457 (8th Cir. 1981);
Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 930 (10th Cir. 1979); Holder v.
Old Ben Co., 618 F.2d 1198, 1199-1202 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
78. Id. at 802.
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ployer successfully does so, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that
the employer's explanation is a pretext.79 At all times, however, the
ultimate burden of proving discrimination remains with the plaintiff. 80
In an "adverse impact" case, the nature of the plaintiff's case is
significantly different. The emphasis shifts from the employer's mo-
tives or intent to the consequences of its employment policies or
practices. As the Court observed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,8
"intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem em-
ployment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-
in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability. . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." 82
The Court has approved the use of this approach to challenge
employment tests,83 height and weight requirements8 4 and educational
requirements such as a high school diploma. 85 In contrast to the
disparate treatment theory, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer who must show
a business necessity for the practice.8 6 If the employer satisfies its
burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff who must demonstrate
the existence of other selection mechanisms capable of accomplishing
the same goal without so severely impacting the protected group.87
In an individual action, regardless of which theory the successful
plaintiff has relied upon, he is generally entitled to back pay88 and
79. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981);
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
80. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981);
see Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 n.2
(1978); id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (burden of persuasion "never shifts"). Of course, if the
plaintiff's case is tried on the merits, the court must decide the ultimate issue of
liability and the presumption " 'drops from the case.' " United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
81. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
82. Id. at 432. See generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 59
(1972).
83. E.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-29 (1971).
84. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
85. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-27 (1971).
86. E.g., Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir.
1981).
87. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); accord Connecticut
v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982).
88. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-25 (1975); accord Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976). By deciding that an employer
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a compensatory award of retroactive seniority. 9 In a class action,
the paradigmatic judgment or consent decree contains three categories
of relief.90 First, employee/victims receive back pay, retroactive sen-
iority and promotions designed to put them in their "rightful place,"
i.e., the job they would have held absent the employer's discrimi-
natory practices. 9' Similar relief is available for applicant/victims
and even for those who can demonstrate that, although they never
specifically applied for a job, they would have applied except for
the employer's known discriminatory hiring policies.92 The relief
granted thus parallels the relief awarded in an individual action.
Second, non-victims receive employment preferences. 93 The purpose
of this relief is not to compensate the non-victim. Rather, it is to
remedy existing class-wide effects of the employer's discriminatory
conduct. This is why the most common form of relief consists of
"percentage" accommodations in the employer's hiring and pro-
motion practices.
In order to attract minority applicants, an employer may be directed
to recruit at schools with a high percentage of minority students,
to place help-wanted ads in the minority media, to keep extensive
records detailing the hiring process or to develop non-biased, job-
related tests. 94
can toll the accrual of a back pay award by unconditionally offering the plaintiff
employment without retroactive seniority, the Court has cut back somewhat on the
expansiveness of these earlier holdings. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.
219 (1982); see also supra note 45.
89. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773-79 (1976). Awards of
retroactive seniority cannot, however, be made to any date earlier than July 2,
1965, the effective date of Title VII. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 351-54 (1977).
90. Model judgments or consent decrees are reprinted at EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
(CCH) 1 1484-97; see also supra note 29.
91. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 343-47
(1977).
92. Id. at 363-71.
93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
94. E.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 355 (5th
Cir. 1977) (employer ordered to recruit management trainees at predominantly black
colleges and universities), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); Jones v. Milwaukee
County, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 519, 525 (E.D. Wisc. 1984) (employer
ordered to advertise vacancies "by means which will reasonably reach members of
the black, Latin and Indian communities"); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 21
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1169 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (employer ordered to keep
detailed reports of recruitment efforts and to notify Arkansas Employment Security
Division and Urban League of vacancies), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1179 (8th Cir. 1980); Abron v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 984, 993, 1002 (D. Md.
1977) (employer ordered to recruit at schools within Baltimore City where percentage
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The problem alluded to in Stotts arises with respect to the second
category of relief, employment preferences benefiting individuals
who are unable to prove that they suffered from specific acts of
discrimination. Justice White's opinion suggests that section 706(g)
prohibits relief for these "non-victims." 95 The impact of this inter-
pretation on Title VII litigation is staggering. It would undo carefully
crafted relief which has been approved by each of the twelve geo-
graphic circuit courts of appeals.
96
III. The Affirmative Action Triad-Bakke, Weber and Fullilove
The insistence of the majority in Stotts that section 706(g) restricts
a court's authority to award preferential treatment to non-victims
of discrimination 97 must be examined in light of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke,9 United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber'9 and Fullilove v. Klutznick.' °° Although they are analyt-
ically distinct, the three cases weave the fabric of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence respecting the most controversial aspect of
affirmative action: reverse discrimination. In each of these cases,
the plaintiff asked the Court to consider the validity-either con-
stitutional or statutory-of a program resulting in the displacement
of the economic and/or educational expectations of the white ma-
jority.'0 1 In each case, the program's beneficiary was a member of
a minority group who benefited from the displacement solely by
virtue of his participation in the minority group. 02 In each case,
actual victimization was not a predicate to entitlement.
Unfortunately, these cases yield few principles by which to test
of black students is greater than suburban school districts), aff'd in part, vacated
in part, 654 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. City of Socorro, 25 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 815, 826 (D. N.M. 1976) (employer ordered to keep detailed records
of recruitment efforts and to advertise the fact of the court's order directing it "to
make every reasonable effort to recruit women"); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp.
581, 582 (D. Mass. 1975) (employer ordered to recruit at colleges with significant
numbers of black students), aff'd, 530 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
935 (1976).
95. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 12.
97. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90.
98. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see infra notes 106-53 and accompanying text.
99. 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see infra notes 154-90 and accompanying text.
100. 448 U.S. 448 (1980); see infra notes 154-90 and accompanying text.
101. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 455 (1980); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 277-78 (1978).
102. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54, 458-59; Weber, 443 U.S. at 193, 198-99;
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272-76.
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Stotts. Despite the cases' parallel issues, the Court's multitudinous
decisions form a crazy quilt pattern, in which order, consistency
and symmetry of values are nowhere to be seen. 03 Numerous scholars
have attempted, with little success, to reconcile the sixteen separate
opinions in these cases into a doctrinal whole or, at a minimum,
to isolate their transcendent themes.' 04 This author makes no pretense
of succeeding where far more renowned commentators have failed.
The question which this article proposes to answer in this section
is a limited one: to what extent do these cases support or undercut
the legitimacy of group relief for non-victims under Title VII?
Obviously, Weber is most directly pertinent to the question since
it involves the legality under Title VII of a voluntary affirmative
action program privately initiated by an employer, using racial quo-
tas. Members of the group benefiting from this largesse were not
themselves victims of any discriminatory conduct on the part of the
employer. 05 Since Fullilove and Bakke involved equal protection
103. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit so aptly remarked, "We
frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke
opinions. In over one hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices
have told us mainly that they have agreed to disagree." United States v. City of
Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc) (per curiam).
Professor Schatzki has explained why it is not possible to reconcile the three
cases in any coherent fashion. "In my judgment, logic will never resolve the
conflicting norms. The reasons which support affirmative action plans cannot be
reconciled with the reasons that dictate the weaknesses of such plans. Griggs and
Bakke, also, were compromises, of sorts, not reconciliations." Schatzki, United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56
WASH. L. REV. 51, 72 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Schatzki].
104. The constitutionality of affirmative action programs in general and "benign"
or "reverse" discrimination in particular has been a fertile field for scholars. They
have waged a lively debate on the legal issues involved as well as the desirability
of goals and quotas from a social perspective. In addition to the literature cited
in supra note 3, see A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 132-33 (1975); Blumrosen,
Quotas, Common Sense, and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal
Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 675 (1974); Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1976); Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscri-
mination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049 (1978); Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1044-45 (1979); Tribe, Perspectives on Bakke: Equal
Protection, Procedural Fairness, or Structural Justice?, 92 HARV. L. REV. 864
(1979); Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 213 (1980). See generally ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER, THE REVERSE Dis-
CRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1980); Bakke Sym-
posium: Civil Rights Perspective, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1979).
105. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979).
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challenges under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respectively,
and not Title VII, they have less direct relevance than Weber does.
They cannot be overlooked, however, because they also touch upon
the propriety of group relief, albeit in a more indirect fashion.
A. The Weber Decision
The Court's opinion in Weber is central to this article's examination
of the concept of group relief for non-victims of discrimination. In
that case, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) and
the United Steelworkers Union of America (USWA) entered into
a collective bargaining agreement establishing a training program to
enable unskilled production workers at various plants to qualify for
craft positions. 106 The Kaiser-USWA agreement was not prompted
by either party's particular solicitude for minority workers. They
were under heavy pressure to accelerate and improve job oppor-
tunities not only from the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
but also from disgruntled black employees who were threatening to
file their own Title VII suit. 0 7
In large measure, admission to the program hinged on the ap-
plicant's race. 08 Under the agreement, Kaiser and the USWA reserved
fifty percent of the places for black employees. Thus, there were two
lists of applicants: one composed of white employees, the other of
black employees. Within each. racial group, selection was made on
the basis of seniority. 0 9
Weber, a white production worker at Kaiser's Gramercy, Louisiana
plant, applied for admission into a training program but was rejected
by operation of the fifty percent quota. Weber, like several other re-
jected white employees, had greater seniority than some of the black
employees selected.' If straight seniority had been the basis for selection,
as normally would be the case, Kaiser would have admitted Weber
106. Id. at 197-98.
107. 443 U.S. 193, 197-98, 209-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (1979); see infra
note 262. In fact, Kaiser's employment practices at another Louisiana plant were
successfully challenged by black employees while Weber was winding its way to
the Supreme Court. See Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d
1374 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 968 (1979), on remand, 497 F. Supp.
339 (E.D. La. 1980).
108. 443 U.S. at 198-99. Technically speaking the affirmative action quota ben-
efited not only blacks, but also other minority groups and women. Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting opinion), rev'd, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). However, at the Kaiser plant where
Weber worked the minority selectees consisted of blacks only. Id.
109. 443 U.S. at 199.
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and other white employees into the program and excluded most of
the black employees. Weber challenged the collective bargaining
agreement, arguing it violated subsections (a) and (d) of Section 703
of Title VII which make it unlawful to "discriminate .. .because
of ... race" in hiring and apprenticeship programs.' '0 The district
court invalidated the plan holding that a quota could be used only
by the courts, and not by private parties, to remedy discrimination.',,
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, while affirming the
decision, did so on a very different ground, foreshadowing Stotts.
It held that quotas could be used only to benefit identifiable victims
of discrimination."12 Judge Wisdom dissented, however, arguing that
the evidence introduced at trial showed "arguable violations of Title
VII" (apart from the plan) by both Kaiser and the USWA. In his
view, the serious possibility of Title VII liability justified the creation
of a race-conscious program to remedy the present effect of past
discrimination. "1 3
The Supreme Court reversed, in a 5-2 decision."14 Justice Brennan
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Stewart, White, Marshall
and Blackmun joined. Justice Blackmun also wrote a separate con-
curring opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Justices Powell and Stevens, for undisclosed reasons, did not par-
ticipate. Justice Brennan's opinion began by defining the issue as
narrowly as possible: "The question for decision is whether Congress,
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . left employers
and unions in the private sector free to take . . . race-conscious steps
110. Id. at 199-204. Earlier, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273 (1976), the Court had ruled that Title VII protects whites as well as
blacks from employment discrimination.
111. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La.
1976). In approving judicially imposed quotas the court noted that: "The most
important and obvious distinction is the fact that sections 703(a) and (d) of Title
VII do not prohibit the courts from discriminating against individual employees
by establishing quota systems where appropriate. The proscriptions of the statute
are directed solely to employers." Id. at 767 (emphasis added). The opinion also
emphasized the court's pivotal responsibilities in assuring that the dictates of due
process were observed, in fashioning relief and in guaranteeing that the plan did
not last any longer than necessary to achieve the goals of Title VII. Id. at 767-
68. Justice Brennan's opinion addresses these concerns, sub silentio, in Weber by
emphasizing four sets of facts necessary to support a voluntary affirmative action
plan. See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
112. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 227-34 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). He also maintained that Title VII
permitted employers to use race-conscious programs to remedy societal discrimi-
nation. Id. at 235-39.
114. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
[Vol. XIV
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to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job
categories.'"I 5
Accepting the proposition that subsections (a) and (d) seemed to
forbid the selection mechanism of the Kaiser-USWA agreement, the
majority nonetheless upheld Kaiser's refusal to admit Weber. Faulting
the plaintiff's "reliance upon a literal construction" of the statute
and recalling the " 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of it makers,' 116 Justice
Brennan insisted that section 703's prohibition of racial discrimi-
nation had to be "read against the background of the legislative
history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act
arose.""17 Since the purpose of Title VII was to bring blacks into
the mainstream of American society, he had little difficulty in con-
cluding that striking down the affirmative action program "would
'bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the
statute' and must be rejected.""' 8
Although the majority opinion does not explicitly so state, little
doubt exists that the Weber result was compelled by the Court's
decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.1"9 and Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody. 120 In Griggs, the Supreme Court ruled that employment
practices neutral on their face nonetheless violated Title VII if they
115. 443 U.S. at 197. At still another point in the opinion, the Court reemphasized
the limited nature of the question, stating: "The only question before us is the
narrow statutory issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions
from voluntarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord racial
preferences in the manner and for the purpose provided in the Kaiser-USWA plan."
Id. at 200.
116. Id. at 201, 202 (citations omitted). Justice Brennan's opinion has met harsh
scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact,
Validity and Equality, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17, 45; Meltzer, The Weber Case: The
Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI.
L. REV. 423 (1980); Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of Redistributing Justice, 21
B.C.L. REV. 1 (1979). While admitting its weaknesses other scholars have nonetheless
applauded its holding. See, e.g., Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action:
An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Belton]; Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment
After Weber, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Employment After
Weber]; Edwards, Affirmative Action or Reverse Discrimination: The Head and
Tail of Weber, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 713 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Head
and Tail of Weber]; Schatzki, supra note 103; see also Boyd, Affirmative Action
in Employment-The Weber Decision, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Boyd].
117. 443 U.S. at 201.
118. Id. at 202.
119. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
120. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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had an adverse impact on minorities and could not be justified as
a business necessity.' 21 In Albemarle Paper Co., the Supreme Court
extended Griggs significantly by placing an affirmative responsibility
on the employer to eliminate the effects of the offending employment
practice. 2 2 Indeed, Justice Brennan quoted Moody's admonition that
Congress intended that Title VII act as a "spur or catalyst to cause
'employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible,
the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this
country's history.' ",123 In other words, what Weber was really com-
plaining about was the efforts of Kaiser and the union to follow
the Supreme Court's dictate in Moody!
Justice Brennan's opinion in Weber, however, did not give an
unqualified imprimatur to any and all race-conscious plans adopted
by an employer. 24 Four sets of facts drew heavy emphasis: first,
that the program was voluntarily adopted; 25 second, that it did not
"unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees;"' 26 third, that
121. 401 U.S. at 429-33.
122. 422 U.S. at 417-18; see Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High
Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954-55 (1982).
123. 443 U.S. at 204 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975)) (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 208.
125. Id. at 200-01. The question of the plan's voluntary character is open to
dispute. Executive Orders 11246 and 11375 obligated Kaiser to adopt an affirmative
action program as a condition of doing business with the government.
The courts have been unsympathetic to claims that compliance with E.O. 11246
was not "voluntary." See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1295 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Tangren v. Wackenhut
Services, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
For a stimulating analysis of the "voluntary" component of the Weber rationale,
see Cox, The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas and Some
Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 87 (1981).
126. 443 U.S. at 208. It is important to recall that as a result of the "50/50"
split lists, no white employee suffered the loss of a vested-or even anticipated-
benefit. No whites were laid off; none were "bumped"; none suffered any diminution
of seniority rights. Ironically, if Kaiser and the USWA (admittedly acting out of
self-interest) had not agreed to the in-plant training program, the white workers
could not have qualified for the craft position and would have remained in their
unskilled production jobs. See id. at 198-99.
The selection of an appropriate percentage for awarding benefits based on race
is a difficult one. Under the collective bargaining agreement, 50%o of the places
were reserved for blacks. The percentage of black workers in the labor force,
however, was 3907o. 443 U.S. at 198-99. This discrepancy has generated much
discussion concerning the computation of Weber-type quotas. See Allegretti, Vol-
untary Racial Goals After Weber: How High Is Too High?, 17 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 773 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Allegrettil. Professor Allegretti suggests interim
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it was temporary in nature;'2 7 and fourth, that it was designed "to
eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories."' 28
Post-Weber litigation in the lower courts has generally revolved
around the significance of these four facts.'2 9 Based on Dothard v.
goals should rarely exceed 50%. Id. at 796. Similarly, Professor Blumrosen, has
said "[tjo reserve all jobs for minorities or women is probably illegal; reservation
of more than fifty percent may be suspect. Employment After Weber, supra note
116, at 33; see Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 510-11 (8th Cir.) (interim
goal 25%, final goal 5%), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614, 619-22 (5th Cir. 1974) (interim goal 50%, final goal 25%); Price
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Sacramento County, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 275-76, 604 P.2d
1365, 1376, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475, 486-87 (1980) (interim goal 33%, final goal 8%).
127. 443 U.S. at 208-09. The "temporary" nature of the program is a matter
of some dispute. Justice Rehnquist cited the testimony of Kaiser's industrial relations
superintendent, who indicated that once the percentage of black employees in craft
positions reached 39% Kaiser would continue " 'placing trainees in the program
at that percentage.' " 443 U.S. at 224 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Kaiser will not be facing the problem of maintaining the racial balance
of its work force for some time, however. Most commentators agree that the
percentage of black craftspersons at the plant will not equal the percentage of
blacks in the local labor force until the plan has been in effect for 30 years.
Powers, Implications of Weber-"A Net Beneath", 5 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 325,
329 (1979).
128. 443 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted). Lower courts in interpreting Weber's re-
quirement of a "traditionally segregated job category" have generally looked to "a
history of racial discrimination in the relevant occupation or profession at large,"
Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia, 484 F. Supp. 411, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
or "some type of statistical disparity between the local labor force and the minority
composition of the employer's work force . . . ." Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys.
Inc., 651 F.2d 520, 527 (7th Cir. 1981); accord Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657
F.2d 962, 968 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Tangren
v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539, 546-47 (D. Nev. 1979), aff'd, 658
F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
At least two scholars agree that these approaches are entirely consistent with
Weber. Allegretti, supra note 126, at 785-96; Boyd, supra note 116, at 10-21.
129. The Court was acutely self-conscious about the vagueness of the facts which
it found significant:
We need not today define in detail the line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans. It suffices to hold
that the challenged Kaiser-USWA affirmative action plan falls on the
permissible side of the line. The purposes of the plan mirror those of
the statute. Both were designed to break down old patterns of racial
segregation and hierarchy. Both were structured to "open employment
opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally
closed to them." 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)
443 U.S. at 208 (footnote omitted). Perhaps, only by failing to lay down any hard
and fast lines of demarcation was Justice Brennan able to muster a majority vote.
Kreiling & Mercurio, Beyond Weber: The Broadening Scope of Judicial Approval
of Affirmative Action, 88 DICK. L. REV. 46, 58 n.75 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Kreiling & Mercurio].
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Rawlinson,'30 the courts have refused to distinguish between affirm-
ative action plans adopted by private employers and those adopted
by public employers.'31 No additional quarter has been given to, or
taken from, the public sector employer under Title VII.132 Weber,
moreover, has not been limited to preferences based on race. Its
protection has been extended to female employees as well.' 33
Although he "shared" some of the dissents' misgivings concerning
the majority's interpretation of Title VII's legislative history, Justice
Blackmun joined in the majority opinion. In his concurring opinion,
however, he approached the validity of Kaiser's training program
from a different perspective. Adopting the analysis of Judge Wis-
dom's dissenting opinion, he stated he would have shielded Kaiser
from Title VII liability based on an "arguable violation" theory.'34
Fearing that the majority opinion's reliance on a "traditionally
segregated job category" approach cut too broad a swath in per-
130. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
131. See generally C. SULLIVAN, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION 205 (1980). For the argument that courts in resolving reverse discrim-
ination claims challenging Weber-type affirmative action programs imposed in the
public sector should be more tolerant than in reviewing similar private sector plans,
see Kreiling & Mercurio, supra note 129, at 108.
132. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); United States v. City of
Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1336-37 n.27 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 664 F.2d 435
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young,
608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Scott v. City of
Anniston, Ala., 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980);
United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 423-24 (7th Cir. 1978); Firefighters
Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 819 (1977); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Sacramento County, 26 Cal.
3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980); Chmill v. City of Pittsburgh,
22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,783 (Pa. 1980).
Of course, it is theoretically possible that action taken by the public sector
employer, while consistent with Title VII, would nonetheless violate the fourteenth
amendment. As noted earlier, supra note 17, the Court has granted certiorari to
review the fourteenth amendment implications of an affirmative action program
employing quotas for the benefit of non-victims. Several courts have concluded
that a voluntary affirmative action plan which passes muster under Weber will also
pass muster under the Constitution. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher,
679 F.2d 965, 976 (1st Cir. 1982). Other courts have imposed a more rigorous
standard. See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 884-87 (6th Cir.),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 509-10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
133. La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982); Edmondson v. United
States Steel Corp., 21 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,380 (N.D. Ala. 1979); see
Minnick v. California Dept. of Correction, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 157 Cal. Rptr.
260 (1979); Maehren v. City of Seattle, 92 Wash. 2d 480, 599 P.2d 1255 (1979).
134. 443 U.S. at 209-16. The "arguable violation" theory fits Kaiser's situation




mitting an employer to parcel out benefits based on race, Justice
Blackmun argued for a more restrained standard.'35
Chief Justice Burger's dissent characterized the majority as being
result-oriented. "[T]he Court effectively rewrites Title VII to achieve
what it regards as a desirable result. It 'amends' the statute to do
precisely what both its sponsors and its opponents agreed the statute
was not intended to do.) 136
The tone of Justice Rehnquist's dissent was far more strident.
"[B]y a tour de force reminiscent not of jurists such as Halt, Holmes,
and Hughes, but of escape artists such as Houdini, the Court eludes
135. 443 U.S. at 212-15. As Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion hinted, the
question of the type and quantum of evidence necessary to justify adoption of a
Weber-like affirmative action program has not been a simple one. See, e.g., La
Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (police department had previously
excluded women from certain job categories); Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc.,
658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981) (statistical imbalance between work force and labor
force), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962
(8th Cir.) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 938 (1981); Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia, 484 F. Supp. 411
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (historical and societal discrimination in the teaching profession
nationally); Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (same),
aff'd sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
Several courts, however, have rejected ad hoc affirmative action decisions allegedly
-made pursuant to Weber. See, e.g., Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d
520 (7th Cir. 1981); Savage v. McAvoy, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,085
(S.D. Ohio 1980); Thomas v. Basic Magnesia, Inc., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1284 (N.D. Fla. 1980).
Prior to Weber, the EEOC promulgated guidelines outlining the circumstances
under which it would refuse to take action on a reverse discrimination charge
against an employer who had voluntarily implemented an affirmative action program
benefiting minority and/or female employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3 (1979). Admittedly,
the guidelines did not exist in 1974 when Kaiser and the USWA implemented the
collective bargaining agreement. However, the Court's failure to mention them even
in passing is curious since they are mutually reinforcing. Cf Employment After
Weber, supra note 116, at 10-11 nn.25-28 (discussing the guidelines as a post-
Weber defense in reverse discrimination cases). Because these guidelines con-
stituted a "written interpretation or opinion" of the EEOC within the meaning of
section 713(b)(i), reliance upon them would be a defense to reverse discrimination
claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 713(b)(i) (1978), omitted, Pub. L. No. 97-35, Title XXI
§ 2192(a) 95 Stat. 818 (1981).
136. 443 U.S. at 216 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice's complaint with
the majority decision was not one directed to the merits of the quota system; he
simply believed that it was not Congress' intent in enacting Title VII to authorize
private voluntary affirmative action programs employing a race-conscious quota.
Id. at 216-19. The Chief Justice noted that if he were a legislator he would vote
in favor of such a program. Id. at 216. Barely a year later in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980), he delivered an opinion in which Justices Powell and White
joined, sustaining a 10% "quota" on federal funding in the Public Works Em-
ployment Act of 1977. Id. at 486-89; see infra notes 179-82 and accompanying
text.
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clear statutory language, 'uncontradicted' legislative history, and
uniform precedent in concluding that employers are, after all, per-
mitted to consider race in making employment decisions."' 3 7 His
opinion contains an exhaustive review of the Congressional debate
surrounding Title VII's enactment and offers a strong argument
against race-conscious relief for non-victims. Rehnquist's thirty-six
page opinion rings with a litany of exchanges among the bill's
supporters and opponents, and its multiple citations to contempor-
aneous interpretive memoranda cannot be dismissed lightly.
Two aspects of Justice Brennan's majority opinion are particularly
important: first, its analysis of Congress' purpose in enacting Title
VII, and second, its factual predicate, i.e., a voluntary program
adopted without judicial approval and without a finding of prior
discrimination by any state or federal administrative body or court.
In fleshing out the "spirit" of Title VII, the Court abandoned
its usual focused review of Title VII's legislative history in favor
of a broader perspective.' 38 As indicated earlier, this author believes
that the Stotts Court took a far too restrictive view of Congress'
goal in enacting Title VII. The eradication of racial discrimination
137. 443 U.S. at 222 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion has not escaped criticism. Particularly troublesome is its lack of internal
consistency regarding Congress' intent. On the one hand, he vigorously contends
that the race-conscious program is flatly contrary to Congress' intention. Id. at
220, 227-51. On the other hand, he admits that the possibility of race-conscious
programs such as Kaiser's was never even contemplated by the legislative branch.
Id. at 251-53.
Justice Rehnquist's position is also arguably inconsistent with his position in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), in which he joined the
majority opinion authored by Justice Stewart and filed a separate concurring opinion.
There, the Court approved the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1974) (no
longer in effect), which, inter alia, required an employer to undertake a "differential
validation" of employment tests having an adverse impact on minorities. 422 U.S.
at 430-36. The employer had to adjust the test scores to eradicate the discriminating
impact. Clearly, the Guidelines approved by Justice Rehnquist required the use of
race-conscious adjustments.
It is interesting to note that in United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977), Justice Rehnquist joined in two segments of Justice White's opinion ap-
proving the use of race-conscious criteria by the state in constructing legislative
districts. He did not reject Justice White's view that this mechanism was a valid
means to assure "a fair allocation of political power between white and nonwhite
voters." Id. at 167. Justice Stevens, who did not participate in Weber, agreed with
this view. Id. at 147.
138. 443 U.S. at 201-07. Justice Brennan's exclusive reliance on Title VII's 1964
legislative history is perplexing. It offers almost no support for his conclusion.
Schatzki, supra note 103, at 67. What is even more perplexing, however, is his
failure to discuss the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments which do offer
support. See supra notes 262-82 and accompanying text; The Head and Tail of
Weber, supra note 116, at 743-50.
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in the workplace was only one element of that body's attempt to
compel the complete integration of blacks into American life. Thus
viewed, the references to individual relief and "make-whole" relief
selectively culled by the Stotts majority from Title VII's legislative
history diminish in significance. In Weber, the Court's treatment of
the legislative history approaches this broader perspective, although
in the author's opinion it is not as panoramic as Congress' in 1964.
Rather than examining Title VII as an isolated piece of legislation,
the majority viewed it in terms of "the goals of the Civil Rights
Act-the integration of blacks into the mainstream of American
society."' 3 9 Title VII is thus seen as a means to this greater end.
It quoted with approval Senator Humphrey's statement:
What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine
restaurant if he cannot afford to pay the bill? What good does
it do him to be accepted in a hotel that is too expensive for his
modest income? How can a Negro child be motivated to take
full advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no
hope of getting a job where he can use that education?
Without a job, one cannot afford public convenience and ac-
commodations. Income from employment may be necessary to
further a man's education, or that of his children. If his children
have no hope of getting a good job, what will motivate them to
take advantage of educational opportunities?'40
Justice Brennan's opinion is replete with extensive citations to the
Congressional Record to demonstrate Congress' concern for the
economic plight of black Americans, the more fortunate of whom
were able to find jobs without a future, while the less fortunate
were unemployed.' 4'
Given this perspective, the argument in favor of relief for non-
identified victims of racial discrimination in employment is even
stronger. What the Weber Court approved in the context of a private
voluntary agreement is precisely what the Stotts Court disapproved
in the context of a consent judgment. The district court in Weber
specifically found that the black employees benefiting from the quota
"had never themselves been the subject of any unlawful discrimi-
nation .... 1112 A similar finding was made in Stotts. 143 Weber clearly
139. 443 U.S. at 202.
140. Id. at 203 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 202-03.
142. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 769 (E.D.
La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
143. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2588-89 (1984).
Along these same lines, it is interesting to note that in Griggs the evidence presented
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stands for the proposition that a racial quota benefiting non-victims
is permissible if adopted voluntarily by "the private sector ... to
eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories."'" Why should Title VII compel a different result if the
quota is imposed by a court? Given Weber's interpretation of Title
VII's legislative history, there is no persuasive justification for a
different result. Reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that the
affirmative action program adopted by Kaiser and the USWA was
modeled after a Title VII consent decree entered for the steel in-
dustry. 45 That consent judgment contained no admission of wrong-
doing by the defendants; it established a racial quota for admission
into training programs; and it awarded relief to non-victims.14 Under
Stotts, these provisions of the consent judgment are invalid and
would be invalid if contained in a judgment entered after a trial.
Under Weber, these same provisions, if contained in a private agree-
ment would represent legitimate affirmative efforts to correct racial
imbalance. Neither the legislative history nor common sense supports
such a conclusion. As Professor Edwards has so succinctly stated,
"Title VII cannot distinguish remedies by their sources.' ' 47 A re-
medial program should be no more or less prohibited because it is
voluntarily undertaken by an employer or ordered by a court.
Justice Powell once observed in another context that "[rJespect
and support for the law, especially in an area as sensitive as [af-
firmative action], depend in large measure upon the public's per-
ception of fairness.' ' 4 With that admonition in mind, examination
of the Weber/Stotts dichotomy from the perspective of the black
to support the plaintiffs' claim of adverse impact consisted of the scores of blacks
who were not parties to the litigation. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430 n.6 (1971).
144. 443 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 210 (citing United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc.,
517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975)). In Allegheny-Ludlum, the settlement resolved charges
of racial and sexual discrimination against nine of the nation's largest steel companies
and resulted in a sweeping overhaul of the industry's employment practices and
in back pay awards of over $30 million dollars to approximtely 50,000 minority
workers. Employment After Weber, supra note 116, at 6-7 n.13. Provisions similar
to the Kaiser/USWA agreement were also included in the union's contracts with
Reynolds Metals and ALCOA, the other two major American aluminum producers.
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 229 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting).
146. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., Consent Decree I, FAR EMPL.
PRAC. MANUAL (BNA), 431:125, 138-39 (1974). To compare the Kaiser collective
bargaining agreement and the steel industry consent judgment, see Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
147. The Head and Tail of Weber, supra note 116, at 752.
148. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 n.8 (1980) (citing, interalia, Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 n.53 (1978)).
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production worker seeking entry to a training program like the one
at Kaiser/USWA merits consideration.'1 9 Under Weber, he can be
the beneficiary of a racial quota "designed to eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories" if his
employer and union agree to such an affirmative action program. 50
There is absolutely no requirement of an admission of liability on
the employer's or union's part or of any similar finding by a court
or administrative agency.
What happens, however, if the employer and union do not agree
and a Title VII suit ensues? Stotts stands for the proposition that
if a person was an actual victim of the discriminatory conduct, he is
entitled to be made whole and restored to his rightful place. On
the other hand, if he can prove only discriminatory conduct, without
demonstrating that he was actually victimized, advancement by means
of a racial quota guaranteeing the participation of minority employees
in a training program is foreclosed if it is embodied in a consent
judgment. From the perspective of the black production worker, the
fact that a voluntary agreement entered in a non-judicial context
gives him a significantly greater possibility for economic advancement
than the same agreement entered in the context of resolving a judicial
proceeding seems absurd. The absurdity intensifies if the same rule
holds true for a judicially imposed remedy entered after a finding
of liability on the merits.
Closely tied to this incongruity is the inhibitory effect of Stotts
on Title VII settlements. As noted earlier, both the majority opinion
and Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Weber emphasize the
voluntary aspect of the Kaiser/USWA collective bargaining agree-
ment. '5 Time and time again the Court has noted Congress' intent
in Title VII to promote voluntary settlements of employment dis-
crimination suits. 5 2 The Stotts dicta significantly undermine the
149. For an excellent account of the "human" side of the Weber dispute, see
Roberts, The Bakke Case Moves to the Factory, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1979, § 3
(Magazine), at 37, col. 3.
150. 443 U.S. at 209 (footnote omitted).
151. See supra note 125 and accompanying text; 443 U.S. at 210-12 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
152. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982); Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981). As the Court observed in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.:
Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred
means for achieving this goal. To this end, Congress created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby
existing state and local equal employment opportunity agencies, as well
as the Commission, would have an oportunity to settle disputes through
conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was
permitted to file a lawsuit.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
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Congressional purpose. Suppose the facts giving rise to Weber had
not occurred in 1974 but a decade later? Three scenarios are possible.
In the first, the union agrees with the employer that affirmative
relief for present black employees is warranted, and they establish
a quota-based training program. This is a pure Weber situation, and
Stotts has no impact. In the second, the union, in light of an
economic downturn and the conservative views of its overwhelmingly
white membership, declines to agree to such a program.'53 What real
option does the employer have other than to wait until he is sued?
If he is sued, little incentive exists to settle other than the avoidance
of the expense and inconvenience of litigation. The employer knows,
as undoubtedly his white work force knows, that under Stotts,
regardless of whether the court enters judgment after a trial or
approves a consent decree submitted by the parties, the employer
is powerless to confer the benefit of craft training on black employees
who are not actual victims of discrimination. Thus, the employer
can "guts it out," hoping he can persuade the court that he did
not discriminate, and knowing that if he loses on the merits, Stotts
curtails the court's remedial powers. Correspondingly, the black
employee has little incentive to sue unless he possesses overwhelming
evidence to prove that he was an actual victim of the employer's
discriminatory conduct.
B. The Bakke and Fullilove Decisions
In Bakke, the medical school of the University of California at
Davis had reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats exclusively for
minority students. 5 4 In Fullilove, Congress set aside 10 percent of
the funds appropriated under the Public Works Act of 1977 for
minority business enterprises (MBE's). t'" The Congressional set-aside
withstood the constitutional challenge; the Davis program did not.
The reason the Court reached opposite holdings can be explained
by a number of facts. In Fullilove, the Court was dealing with a
Congressional enactment rooted in not one but three separate sources
of constitutional authority: the spending power, the commerce clause
153. This is precisely what happened in Stotts. 104 S. Ct. at 2586.
154. 438 U.S. at 275.
155. Pub. L. No. 95-28, title 1, § 103, 91 Stat. 116 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6705(0(2) (1982)). Section 6705(0(2) defines the term "minority business enter-
prise" as "a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group
members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the
stock of which is owned by minority group members." Id. "[Mlinority group
members" are defined as "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-
speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id.
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and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.'5 6 While the means
Congress selected were startling, since no other piece of federal
legislation had ever bestowed benefits based on a strict racial quota,
previous programs designed to aid racial groups suffering from
economic disadvantage had failed.'5 7 In denying the plaintiffs' facial
challenge to the statute's constitutionality, the Supreme Court em-
phasized that the statute effected a one-time infusion of federal
funds into the construction industry; that the amount of money
reserved for minorities was de minimis in comparison to the amount
spent nationally each year for construction projects; that a waiver
procedure was available if no qualified MBE's could be found for
a particular project; and that an administrative mechanism was
available to weed out fraudulent MBE's.'5 8
In contrast, the Davis program was adopted and administered by
the Board of Regents of California, a body having no particular
responsibility for the elimination of discrimination. The program
was a continuing one, and because of the way it was administered,
it totally excluded non-minority applicants from consideration for
admission. 159
For purposes of this Article, two critical principles emerge from
these decisions: first, that a race-conscious program can be a con-
stitutionally valid means to remedy prior discrimination; and second,
that there is no constitutional requirement that such a remedy be
tailored to benefit only actual victims of discrimination. A polling
of the individual Justices' opinions demonstrates the firm support
of the Court, as an institution, for both of these propositions. In
Bakke, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun held that
the purpose of title VI (Title VI) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was co-
extensive with that of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and did not bar preferential treatment of minorities as
a means of remedying past societal discrimination.'16 In reviewing
156. 448 U.S. at 473-80.
157. Id. at 463-67. Roughly the same groups had been the beneficiaries of the
section 8(a) program of the Small Business Act of 1958. 15 U.S.C. § 637 (1982).
That program, however, was designed to aid small businesses owned by " 'socially
or economically disadvantaged persons,' " 448 U.S. at 465-66 (citation omitted),
and thus benefited other racial and ethnic groups as well.
158. There is no majority opinion. A careful reading of the opinion filed sup-
porting the Court's judgment shows, however, that these factors were relied upon
by a majority of the justices in upholding the statute's constitutionality. See id.
at 463-72, 484-85 n.72, 487-89 (Burger, C.J.); id. at 503-06, 511-13 (Powell, J., con-
curring).
159. 438 U.S. 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 361.
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race-conscious remedies, these Justices would ask two questions: is
there "an important and articulated purpose" for use of the racial
classification and does the classification avoid "stigmatiz[ing] any group
or ... singl[ing] out those least well represented in the political pro-
cess to bear the brunt of a benign program?" 6 ' If the answer to both
questions is affirmative, the program or statute would meet their
approval. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart, and
Rehnquist disagreed with the "Brennan group"; they maintained
that Title VI proscribed the Davis minority admissions program
because it excluded Bakke, a white male applicant, from consideration
on account of his race. 62
With the Court thus equally divided, Justice Powell became the
swing vote. He agreed with the Brennan group respecting the coex-
tensiveness of Title VI and the fourteenth amendment. However, he
rejected its intermediate standard of review in favor of strict scrutiny. 163
Since none of the reasons articulated by the Regents to support the
Davis quota system withstood Justice Powell's strict scrutiny analysis,
his vote broke the 4-4 split and the Davis program was invalidated.' 64
In sum, the "arithmetic" of the Justices' opinions shows that at
least five of them, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell,
shared the common view that race-conscious remedies are a legitimate
means of remedying an equal protection violation.
As for the issue of group relief, the Brennan group had little
difficulty in not requiring actual victimization as a predicate to the
government's conferring of benefits.
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past
societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently important
to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs where
there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepre-
sentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of
past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the Medical
School. 161
161. Id.
162. Id. at 408-21.
163. Id. at 305-20. See generally Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice
Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 21 (1979); McCormick, Race and
Politics in the Supreme Court: Bakke to Basics, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 491 (1979);
O'Neil, Bakke in Balance: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 143
(1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1043-50 (1979); STONE, Equal Protection in Special Admissions
Programs: Forward from Bakke, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719 (1979); Sultan, Legal
Logic, Judicial Activity, and the Bakke Case: Mr. Justice Powell and the Integrity
of Constitutional Principle, 30 AM. J. COMp. L. 51 (Supp. 1982).
164. 438 U.S. at 287-324.
165. Id. at 362.
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To support this view Justice Brennan first turned to the school
desegregation cases in which race-conscious remedies had been fre-
quently approved. 166 He turned next to Title VII.
Congress can and has outlawed actions which have a dispropor-
tionately adverse and unjustified impact upon members of racial
minorities and has required or authorized race-conscious action
to put individuals disadvantaged by such impact in the position
they otherwise might have enjoyed. See Franks v. Bowman Trans-
portation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977). Such relief does not require as a predicate
proof that recipients of preferential advancement have been in-
dividually discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient
is within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims
of discrimination. See id., at 357-362. Nor is it an objection to
such relief that preference for minorities will upset the settled
expectations of nonminorities.167
Justice Powell's view of the constitutionality of "group relief" is
more troublesome. One of the reasons advanced by Davis in support
of its special admissions program for minorities was the need to
remedy societal discrimination. 61 Justice Powell had no tolerance
for this argument since, in his view, it would result in converting
"a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a
privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at
their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal
discrimination."'' 69 However, as Professor Sedler has so capably
pointed out, what Justice Powell called
166. Id. at 362-63. "In each [case], the creation of unitary school systems, in
which the effects of past discrimination had been 'eliminated' . . . was recognized
as a compelling social goal justifying the overt use of race." Id. at 363 (citation
omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 306-10.
169. 438 U.S. at 310. Justice Powell did not participate in the Weber decision.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. His hostility towards recognizing the
eradication of societal discrimination as a valid governmental goal on a constitutional
level suggests that he would have found the Kaiser/USWA program inconsistent
with Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII. His view in Bakke is certainly consistent
with his subscribing to Justice White's opinion in Stotts. However, in Fullilove,
he sustained the validity of the 10% set aside although Congress enacted the statute
to eradicate the effects of societal discrimination in the construction industry. Justice
Powell had not yet joined the Court when Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), was decided. Clearly, the Griggs Court intended to compel employers
to remedy the effects of societal discrimination in education manifested by low
scoring test results. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806
(1973), Justice Powell commented: "Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood
deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from
forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious
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"societal discrimination" is nothing more than an accumulation
of wrongs on the part of governmental and private entities that
cannot be identified with particularity at the present time. But
their consequences are no less enduring because they cannot be
so identified. The non-identifiable nature of the discrimination
does not obviate the government's valid and substantial interest
in redressing its consequences. 70
Justice Powell's view is tempered, however, by his references to Title
VII. He specifically stated that Bakke "does not call into question
congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as consent
decrees under Title VII.' 171 He viewed the Griggs disparate impact
test as being "based on legislative determinations . . . that past
discrimination had handicapped various minority groups to such an
extent that disparate impact could be traced to identifiable instances
of past discrimination. 117 2
Moreover, one can read Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, es-
pecially in light of Fullilove, as supporting the proposition that the
deplorable statistics cited at length by Congress in 1964, which reflect
the limited minority participation in the American economy, con-
stitute a Congressional finding of discrimination sufficient to justify
race-conscious remedies.' 73 This view is reinforced by his citation to
two circuit court opinions approving race-conscious remedies, im-
plemented pursuant to E.O. 11246, even though no court or agency
had made a finding of discrimination against the employer. 74 In
sum, while Justice Powell can hardly be counted in the Brennan
group as a wholehearted supporter of group relief for non-victims,
his opinion in Bakke is more nuanced than it appears on a first
reading and displays a potential receptivity to the argument.
A "head count" of the Justices in Fullilove shows these same
two principles winning the support of the majority of Justices. There
burden on such citizens for the remainder of their lives." It has been suggested
that the distinction between "identified" discrimination and "societal" discrimi-
nation is essentially meaningless "because 'societal discrimination' is largely an
aggregate of individual instances of constitutional or statutory violations that have
not been identified with particularity." Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution
and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133,
168 n.149 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sedler].
170. Sedler, supra note 169, at 157.
171. 438 U.S. at 302 n.41.
172. Id. at 308 n.44.
173. See United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir.
1980), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per curiam).
174. Id. (citing Justice Powell's citation to Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of
Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), and Associated
General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974)).
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was no majority opinion for the Court.'75 Both concurring opinions
were used by their authors to expand further on the position each
advocated in Bakke regarding the standard of review to be used in
measuring the constitutionality of race-conscious remedies.
As might be expected, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun'7 6
stuck to their Bakke standard: legislation which employs a racial
classification is constitutional if the government can demonstrate
"'an important and articulated purpose for its use' " and the
legislation does not " 'stigmatiz[e] any group or ... singl[e] out
those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt
of a benign program.' ,,,7" In their view, "the 10% minority set-
aside provision at issue in this case is plainly constitutional. Indeed,
the question is not even a close one."' 7 The Chief Justice found
it unnecessary to elect between Justice Powell's strict scrutiny test
and the intermediate test propounded by the Brennan group in Bakke
since he concluded that the statute satisfied both formulae. 179 While
remaining faithful to his view in Bakke that Congress, in enacting
Title VI, explicitly intended to prohibit programs such as the one
at Davis, the Chief Justice examined the flip side of Title VI and
concluded that Congress, if it so elected, could adopt race-conscious
programs in an attempt to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination. 80
175. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment and wrote an opinion in
which Justices White and Powell joined. 448 U.S. 448, 453 (1980). Justice Powell
also filed a concurring opinion as did Justice Marshall who was joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun. Id, at 495, 517. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 522. These dissenting Justices adhered
to their position in Bakke, that the Constitution is color-blind and that accordingly
all race-conscious government actions are per se unconstitutional even if intended
to aid minorities rather than to stigmatize them. 448 U.S. at 522-32 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens also dissented in a separate opinion in which he spe-
cifically refused to join with Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in calling for a totally
color-blind constitution. Id. at 532, 548, 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His opinion
focused on the legislative process leading up to the statute's enactment which he
found to be defective due to Congress' failure to consider carefully the need for
the racial classification, the composition of the ethnic groups benefiting from the
set-aside and the amount of the set-aside. Id. at 532-54.
176. Why Justice White abandoned the "Brennan" group and joined only in
the Chief Justice's opinion is a mystery. Professor Choper suggests that he did so
as a matter of politics "to lend sufficient numerical strength to the Burger opinion
so as to allow the Chief Justice to announce the judgment of the Court." Choper,
The Constitutionality of Affirmativ Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70
Ky. L.J. 1, 5-6 n.30 (1981).
177. 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 492.
180. Id. at 473-78, 492 n.77. A compelling argument can be made that the
legislative branch, not the judicial branch, is constitutionally charged with the
responsibility for determining whether the fifth and fourteenth amendments demand
absolute neutrality or permit race-conscious remedies. See Cox, The Question of
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The parallels between the Chief Justice's opinion in Fullilove and
Justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke are striking: both generally cite
the same Title VII and school desegregation cases.'81 Although he
did not address the issue of group relief as directly as Justice Brennan,
the Chief Justice, in Fullilove, found no constitutional infirmity in
the absence of a statutory requirement of proof of victimization.
The Chief Justice did cite guidelines promulgated by the Economic
Development Agency in administering the program which arguably
limited participation to MBE's who had suffered discrimination, but
the guidelines' vagueness leaves little doubt that actual victimization
was not a prerequisite to participating in the set-aside. 82
Justice Powell's separate concurring opinion echoes the themes of
the Chief Justice's opinion, in which he also joined. Applying the
strict scrutiny test to the ten percent set-aside, he concluded "[i]n
this case, where Congress determined that minority contractors were
victims of purposeful discrimination and where Congress chose a
reasonably necessary means to effectuate its purpose. I find no con-
stitutional reason to invalidate § 103(f)(2)."' ' 3 Like Chief Justice
Burger, he had no problem with the formulation of race-conscious
remedies to rectify violations of a constitutional magnitude.'84 For
Justice Powell, the predicate to such relief is a finding of discrimina-
tion by a governmental body having "the authority to act in response to
identified discrimination."'' 85 Referring to Title VII, he noted that
Congress enacted that statute " 'to assure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to
the disadvantage of minority citizens.' 186 He also cited Franks v.
Bowman Transportation Co. for the proposition that
[aicting to further the purposes of Title VII Congress vested in
the federal courts broad equitable discretion to ensure that "per-
sons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful
employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position
where they would have been were it not for the unlawful dis-
crimination." 187
"Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23
ARIZ. L. REV. 88, 159-78 (1981); Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of Redistributing
Injustice: A Critical View of United States Steelworkers v. Weber and the Misguided
Policy of Numerical Employment, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1, 78 (1979).
181. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362-63 with Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483.
182. 448 U.S. at 468-72.
183. Id. at 516-17 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 496-97 n. 1.
185. Id. at 498 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 499 (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 499-500 (citation omitted).
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This perception of the link between the statute's purpose and the
Court's remedial powers may explain why Justice Powell joined
Justice White's majority opinion in Stotts.
Justice Powell, however, has not been an intractable ideologue
regarding the use of race-conscious remedies. After all, in Fullilove
he approved of Congress' employment of racial quotas to correct
the impact of societal discrimination in the construction industry
despite his ringing condemnation of racial quotas in Bakke. "I Perhaps
if he examined Title VII's legislative history from a broader per-
spective, as urged in this article, his attention would shift from
Congress' concern for "individuals" affected by racial pi'ejudice to
Congress' overriding goal of bringing minorities into the economic
mainstream of American life. Moreover, he has already acknowledged
that congressional findings of discrimination can support racial
quotas. In making that judgment he demanded very little of Congress.
In contrast, the House and Senate reports and the congressional
debates of the 1964 Act and of its 1972 Amendments are crammed
with statistic after statistic showing the bleak economic condition
of blacks caused by "across-the-board" discrimination in employ-
ment.1s9 If a legislative determination of discrimination is a necessary
predicate to group relief, then the legislative history of Title VII is
a powerful indictment.' 90
IV. The Legislative History of the 1964 Act
As the earlier discussion of sections 7030) and 706(g) illustrated,
Title VII, on its face, offers no immediate resolution of the issue
whether a court may order affirmative relief for non-victims."'
Traditional principles of statutory construction then refer us to the
188. Compare Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496-516 (Powell, J., concurring) with Bakke,
438 U.S. at 287-99.
189. E.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6562, 7204-06, 13,080, 13,084, 13,091. The opponents
of the Civil Rights Bill challenged these statistics, claiming that black unemployment
was more prevalent in states which had adopted fair employment practices laws.
E.g., id. at 13,083-84; see also id. at 8619.
190. In passing, one can only speculate about the impact of this vast legislative
history on Justice Stevens. As noted earlier, he did not participate in Weber. Nor
did he reach the constitutionality of the Davis special admissions program in Bakke,
viewing Title VI as a complete bar to its operation. He dissented in Fullilove,
judging the congressional record inadequate to support a program of racial pref-
erences. See 448 U.S. at 532-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, in Fullilove,
he agreed that race-conscious remedies were appropriate to remedy constitutional
violations. Id. at 553-54. These two factors coupled with the detailed legislative
history of Title VII may account for Justice Stevens' staunch resistance-on and
off the bench-to the majority's using Stotts to limit relief to actual victims of
discrimination.
191. See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
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statute's legislative history to ascertain, if at all possible, Congress'
intent. 192
Very often that intent is manifested most clearly in the House
and Senate reports which accompany the act throughout the legislative
process. Especially useful are reports issued by a joint House and
Senate committee which irons out the differences between the two
houses' versions of the same legislation. Unfortunately, there are
no such interperative documents available for Title VII. As discussed
below in more detail, no House committee or sub-committee held
hearings specifically directed to the Civil Rights Bill, the key pred-
ecessor of Title VII. The Senate, moreover, substantively modified
the House bill. It did so, however, not through a Senate committee,
but through informal bi-partisan conferences. Subsequently, the House
voted directly on the Senate bill, thereby obviating the need for a
joint House-Senate conference committee and report. As the result
of Title VII's highly unusual legislative history, 93 one can attempt
to ascertain Congress' intent only through the statements reported
in the Congressional Record. Such a task cannot be undertaken
lightly, however, and is likely to end in confusion because nowhere
during the extensive debate on Title VII were there posed the direct
questions: how do sections 7030) and 706(g) relate to one another;
how, if at all, do they limit a court's authority to fashion a remedy
containing race-conscious relief for non-victims, following a finding
of discrimination; how, if at all, do they limit a court's authority
to approve a consent judgment authorizing such relief? Since these
questions were never raised, expecting to find a satisfactory answer
to them in the debates is misguided.' 94 As Professor Schatzki has
192. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 48.02-.20 (C. Sands 4th
ed. 1984); see Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and
Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
(1975). See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 67-197 (1975); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Con-
stitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970). For a short but interesting
analysis of the "plain meaning" rule in the context of Weber and Bakke, see
Belton, supra note 116, at 591.
The complete legislative history of Title VII is contained in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1967). For an extended discussion of the statute's history,
see Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Vaas]. The legislative history of sections 706(g) and 7030) is
meticulously detailed in Preferential Relief, supra note 93.
193. See supra-note 192.
194. Justice Powell correctly observed in Bakke that: "[tihere simply was no
reason for Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might
be accorded minority citizens; the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing
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so aptly opined, "the legislative history is overwhelmingly incon-
clusive.'" 95
In placing excessive reliance on the give-and-take of the Congres-
sional debates, moreover, the courts have overlooked four facts
which account for the unsatisfactory nature of this mode of inter-
pretation. First, it sharply separates Title VII from the six titles
which precede it and the four which follow it. Title VII, however,
was never attacked or defended in true isolation. It was part and
parcel of a sweeping legislative package. In interpreting Title VII
the courts have repeatedly looked only to the debate specific to it.
Such a narrow approach directly conflicts with Congress' far broader
perspective. In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress was
concerned with the dismal political and social predicament of blacks
as well as their economic straits. Through various mechanisms of
federal enforcement, Congress intended to end the status of blacks
as this country's perpetual underclass via the opening of political,
social and economic vistas previously closed. Accordingly, Title VII
should be examined organically, not functionally, by the courts. The
Weber decision represents a right step in this direction but does not
go far enough. Second, related to the courts' "tunnel vision" is
their failure to appreciate the linguistic/jurisprudential handicap un-
der which Congress was suffering. The Act was clearly aimed at
blacks as a group. Supporters of the bill, however, frequently ex-
pressed the statute's (and especially Title VII's) purpose as protecting
the individual from discrimination. 96 Such references have led the
courts erroneously to shun group relief as inconsistent with Congress'
intent. Their conclusion, however, ignores the philological impedi-
ment burdening Congress: while clearly intending to aid blacks as
problem of how to guarantee those citizens equal treatment." Regents of the University
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 285 (1978). Similarly, Justice Stevens, in an
opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist, observed that "[no doubt, when this leg-
islation was being debated, Congress was not directly concerned with the legality
of 'reverse discrimination' or 'affirmative action.' Its attention was focused on the
problem at hand, the 'glaring ... discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation .... ." Id. at 413 (Stevens, J.) (citing H.R. REP. No. 914,
Part I, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2391, 2393).
195. Schatzki, supra note 103, at 67.
196. E.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (interpretive memorandum submitted by
Sens. Clark and Case); id. at 7253 (remarks of Sen. Case); id. at 8921 (remarks
of Sen. Williams); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454-55 (1982);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 (1978); infra note 208; cf.
infra notes 216-54 and accompanying text (both Title VII's opponents and sup-
porters were opposed to proportional distribution of jobs according to race).
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a group, it lacked the legal terminology to express that intent. The
jurisprudential concept of "group" relief was in its infancy in 1964.91
Third, the courts' narrow focus loses complete sight of the political
and social environment of the debate. The drama of antecedent
events such as the Reverend Martin Luther King's march in Birm-
ingham, Bull Connor's brutal response and the sit-ins at lunch
counters throughout the South had an unmistakeable impact on the
Congressmen.' 9" Contemporaneous events such as the prayer-a-thon
at the Lincoln Memorial, the intense lobbying by coalitions of
religious and labor groups and unprecedented public support for
enactment of a civil rights bill transformed the tone of the debate
from a political one to a moral one. 99
Fourth, the Senate debate, especially that surrounding the cloture
motion, took place in a highly charged environment. The key leg-
islators, whose remarks are often cited by courts, were frequently
physically and psychologically frayed. 200
Part of the reason for the third and fourth failures lies in the
absence of any comprehensive independent study of the political
process culminating in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The absence of such a study has been particularly frustrating because
the Act was the quintessential product of wheeling and dealing among
the White House, civil rights activists and members of Congress.
Only recently has this aspect of the political dimension been the
subject of scholarly analysis. 20 '
In sum, gleaning the intent of Congress from isolated passages
emasculates their complete meaning. Picking and choosing among
statements only leads to selective advocacy. The fact of the matter
is that the debates offer solace to those who defend judicial relief
to non-victims, as well as to those opposed to such relief. Bearing
in mind the debate's ambiguity on this issue and subject to the
197. See supra text accompanying notes 368-79.
198. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at viii.
199. E.g., 110 CONG. REc. 14,328 (remarks of Sen. Muskie); id. at 14,509-11
(remarks of Sen. Dirksen); see SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at xi.
200. C. & B. WHELAN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 124-217 (passim) (1985) [hereinafter cited as the THE LONGEST
DEBATE].
201. THE LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 200, represents the first full-scale ex-
amination of the political and social dimensions of the Act's passage. The authors
are to be congratulated for their exhaustive research. While the courts are loath
to consider secondary sources treating a topic of legal interest from a historical
and political science perspective, their reluctance should diminish in the instance
of Title VII, in light of the absence of traditional source material such as committee
hearings and House and Senate Reports.
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criticisms articulated above, it is nonetheless appropriate to review
the legislative origins of Sections 7030) and 706(g). What follows
constitutes an attempt to distill meaning from the key events sur-
rounding their enactment. The analysis is based upon the pro-
nouncements of the participants during the debate and
contemporaneous documents. It specifically eschews relying on sub-
sequent judicial interpretation.
In February, 1963, President Kennedy sent a message to Congress
announcing the Administration's intention to propose a series of
sweeping reforms in the area of civil rights.2 °2 No specific recom-
mendation was made regarding employment discrimination. The Pres-
ident's message merely outlined what steps the Executive branch was
taking to insure equality of employment opportunity in the federal
government and in the portion of the private sector affected by
government contracts. 0 3 In June, he forwarded a second message
accompanied by a draft text. The draft, however, did not contain
any provision establishing federal remedies for employment discrim-
ination 204
Earlier proposals before Congress did contain such provisions,
and it was quickly agreed among civil rights advocates that the
Administration's bill was deficient without a federally enforceable
right to equal employment opportunity. As several members of the
House Committee on the Judiciary observed:
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an
empty stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in education
is lacking if gainful employment is closed to the graduate. The
opportunity to enter a restaurant or hotel is shallow victory where
202. H.R. Doc. No. 75, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Feb. 28, 1963), reprinted in 1963
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1507. Ironically, the message began with a statement
that is often the rallying cry of those opposed to preferential relief for non-victims.
"Our Constitution is colorblind," wrote Mr. Justice Harlan before the
turn of the century, "and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens." But the practices of the country do not always conform to
the principles of the Constitution. And this message is intended to examine
how far we have come in achieving first-class citizenship for all citizens
regardless of color, how far we have yet to go, and what further tasks
remain to be carried out-by the executive and legislative branches of
the Federal Government, as well as by State and local governments and
private citizens and organizations.
Id.
203. Id. at 1512-13.
204. H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-11 (1963), reprinted in 1963 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1526-36.
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one's pockets are empty. The principle of equal treatment under
law can have little meaning if in practice its benefits are denied
the citizen.2 5
The day after the President's second message, Congressman Celler
of New York introduced the Administration's omnibus bill.2°6 Be-
tween May 2 and August 3, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee held exhaustive hearings on this and several other civil
rights bills. After the hearings were completed, Congressman Celler
proposed a substitute bill.20 7 Amid bitter complaints of "political
opportunism, .... steamroller tactics" and "railroading," the substi-
tute bill was reported by the Judiciary Committee to the full House.
This bill included a "Title VII," outlawing employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race.20 8
The assassination of President Kennedy shortly thereafter raised
grave doubts about the bill's future. Those doubts were dispelled,
however, when President Johnson adamantly stated that passage of
comprehensive civil rights legislation was one of the highest priorities
of his administration.20 9
205. HousE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2513.
206. This version of H.R. 7152 is reprinted in Hearings on Civil Rights Before
Subcomm. No. 5 and the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Part 1, 649-60 (1963). In keeping with the President's June message, no provisions
were suggested to outlaw private acts of employment discrimination.
207. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R.
REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS AT 2392-93.
208. Id. at 26-32, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2401-08. The
"steamrolling" accusation is disingenuous. Although no hearings were held in either
House specifically addressing H.R. 7152, numerous hearings were conducted on
other similar bills. These hearings leave no doubt that Congress was preeminently
concerned with the economic and social plight of blacks as a group. Remedying
individual instances of discrimination was not its goal. See, e.g., Hearing on Equal
Opportunity Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12-15, 47-48, 53-55, 61-63 (1963);
Hearing on Civil Rights Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 230-303 (1963); Hearings on Equal Employment
Opportunity Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 116-17, 321-29, 426-
30, 449-52, 492-94 (1963).
209. President Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress less than a week
after President Kennedy's assassination. His cry for civil rights legislation was
valiant.
This is our challenge-not to hesitate, not to pause, not to turn about
and linger over this evil moment but to continue on our course so that
we may fulfill the destiny that history has set for us. Our most immediate
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The House debate on the substitute bill 210 focused principally on
enforcement mechanisms. Should Congress give the agency charged
with the responsibility of enforcing Title VII cease and desist powers,
like the NLRB's, or should it give the courts the primary respon-
sibility for enforcing the statute? 2'1
The newly constituted bill (the Civil Rights Bill) did not contain
language analogous to the "no preference" wording of section 7030).
It did, however, contain the earliest version of section 706(g). As
originally proposed, the last sentence of section 706(g) read:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement
of an individual as a member of a union ... or the hiring,
reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or
the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was
refused admission, suspended or expelled, or was refused em-
ployment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for
cause.212
tasks are here on this Hill.
First, no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor Pres-
ident Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil
rights bill for which he fought so long. We have talked long enough in
this country about equal rights. We have talked for one hundred years
or more. It is time now to write the next chapter-and to write it in
the books of law.
109 CONG. REC. 22,838, 22,839 (1963).
210. This substitute bill was also numbered H.R. 7152.
211. A great deal of the criticism directed to H.R. 7152 both in the House and
the Senate concerned the statute's proposed enforcement mechanism. The House
and Senate proposed two radically different enforcement mechanisms. In the House
version, jurisdiction to enforce the substantive rights created by the statute was vested
in the federal district courts. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1963),
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2404-05. In the Senate version,
complaints of discrimination were to be prosecuted by the Department of Labor before
an independent agency called the Equal Employment Opportunity Board. Modeled
on the National Labor Relations Board, this agency had the power to issue cease
and desist orders. Judicial review was vested in the court of appeals. SENATE COM-
MITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT, SEN. REP. No.
867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-15 (1964). The Senate ultimately rejected this proposal
As finally adopted, private plaintiffs were given the responsibility for pursuing their
individual claims in federal district courts if EEOC conciliation efforts failed. The
Attorney General's authority was limited to "pattern or practice" cases. Congress
significantly amended Title VII in 1972 to give the EEOC broad litigating authority.
See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86
Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1970)).
Part of the ambiguity during the debate concerning "racial balancing" is at-
tributable to the then unresolved issue of the powers of the enforcing agency. The
bill's opponents repeatedly hurled accusations that "federal inspectors" would take
over all hiring and promotion decisions, dismissing white employees, refusing to
hire white applicants, and setting quotas in order to achieve racial balance. 110
CONG. REC. 1518, 5094, 6563; see also id. at 8500, 9034-35, 9943-44, 10,513.
212. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2405.
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During the House debate the word "cause" was deleted, and an
amendment was adopted substituting in its place "any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national
origin." 2 3 The remarks of Representative Celler, the amendment's
sponsor, strongly supported the proposition that it was not intended
to limit a court's remedial authority; at a minimum, his remarks
reflect the "violation/remedy" ambiguity discussed earlier.2 4 Con-
gressman Gill made similar comments." 5
Problems interpreting section 706(g) also arise from the members'
apprehension of "racial balancing." While eager to open economic
opportunities previously closed to blacks, they feared that employers
and the overseeing federal agency would interpret Title VII as man-
dating that an employer's workforce mirror the racial composition
of the surrounding labor market.21 6 In part this fear sprang from
the absence of a statutory definition of "discrimination." During
both the House and Senate debates, the specter of "federal in-
spectors" usurping management prerogatives and basing Title VII
violations on racial imbalance was never very far from opponents'
parade of horribles.2 7 The minority report of the House Judiciary
Committee, which accompanied the Committee's favorable report
on the Civil Rights Bill, labelled Title VII "racism-in-reverse" and
stridently proclaimed that it would compel employers "to hire in a
'racially balanced' manner." ' 8
213. 110 CONG. REC. 2567-71 (1964).
214.
[T]he court, for example, cannot find any violation of the act which is
based on facts other-and I emphasize "other"-than discrimination on
the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. The discharge
might be based, for example, on incompetence or a morals charge or
theft, but the court can only consider charges based on race, color,
religion, or national origin. That is the purpose of this amendment.
Id. at 2567.
215.
[Ojur purpose is to pinch down the orders that can be issued by the
court to a more narrow range. Thus, we would not interfere with
discharges for ineptness, or drunkeness. We would not interfere with
unfair labor practices that are covered under other acts. We would limit
orders under this act to the purposes of this act.
Id. at 2570.
216. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 66-69 (1963); 110 CONG. REc.
1518, 1540, 1600, 2557-58, 4764, 5092, 6549, 6553, 6563-64, 7207, 7273, 7420,
8618-19, 9113, 9881-82, 10,520, 11,768.
217. Id. at 5094 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 12,617-18 (remarks of Sen.
Muskie).
218. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 69-75 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2437-43.
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In response to the minority report, seven Republican proponents
of the Civil Rights Bill, led by Representative McCulloch, the ranking
Republican member of the Committee who played a key role in
Title VII's enactment, issued a statement assuring that under Title
VII "management prerogatives, [sic] and union freedoms are to be
left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible; '21 9 it also cautioned
the Commission against "promoting equality with mathematical cer-
tainty" and forcing "racial balance upon employers or labor
unions. ''220
Accusations similar to those contained in the Minority Report
were repeated on the floor of the House. 221 Supporters of the bill
insistently denied them. For example, Representative Lindsay ob-
served: "[the Civil Rights Bill] does not impose quotas or any
special privileges . . . . There is nothing whatever in this bill about
racial balance as appears so frequently in the minority report of
the Committee. ' 222 Similarly, Representative Healy stated: "Op-
ponents of the bill say that it sets up racial quotas for job[s] ....
The bill does not do that. ' 223 Representative Goodell said: "There
is nothing here as a matter of legislative history that would require
racial balancing . . . . We are not talking about a union having
to balance its membership or an employer having to balance the
number of employees. There is no quota involved. '2 24
These salvos and retorts reflect the confusion characterizing both
Houses' understanding of sections 703(j) and 706(g). Clearly, "racial
balancing" or the imposition of "quotas," whether undertaken in-
dependently by an employer or compelled by a federal agency, was
219. Id. at 2516. Without the assistance of Representative McCulloch, it is unlikely
that an effective civil rights bill could have emerged from the House. In exchange
for his support, leaders of the Democratic Party promised not to introduce any
amendments to H.R. 7152 without his specific permission. McCulloch was later
castigated by the bill's opponents as the "Czar of the Senate." 110 CONG. REC.
7203, 7215 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
220. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2516.
221. E.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1518 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id. at 1620(remarks of Rep. Abernathy); id. at 1633, 2557-58 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); id.
at 1644 (remarks of Rep. Cleveland).
222. Id. at 1540. Representative Minish observed:
Under title VII, employment will be on the basis of merit, not of race.
This means that no quota system will be set up, no one will be forced
to hire incompetent help because of race or religion, and no one will
be given a vested right to demand employment for a certain job.
Id. at 1600.
223. Id. at 1994.
224. Id. at 2558.
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an anathema. The scope of a court's remedial authority, however,
presents an analytically distinct issue, one not considered by the
majority of speakers. Representative Celler was the only Congressman
who directly addressed this issue during the House debate. He stated:
[n]o order could be entered against an employer except by a court,
and after a full and fair hearing, and any such order would be
subject to appeal as is true in all court cases.
Even then, the court could not order that any preference be
given to any particular race, religion or other group, but would
be limited to ordering an end to discrimination. 225
The meaning of this statement is not crystal clear. What is a "pref-
erence"? Does the court award a preference if it orders an employer:
to promote black employees in a fixed ratio to white employees; to
hire black applicants in a fixed ratio to white applicants; to provide
special training programs for blacks; or to establish recruitment
programs directed at the minority community? Read literally, his
statement would seem to preclude a court from granting "make-
whole" relief to discriminatees. To limit a court's authority "to
ordering an end to discrimination" would have made Title VII a
paper tiger, a result quite obviously at odds with Representative
Celler's purpose. A careful reading of the entire House debate
suggests that "preference" is somehow linked to "racial balancing,"
a practice which the bill's supporters insisted was not their intent
to legislate. 226
In sum, the clear consensus of the Civil Rights Bill's supporters
was that, if enacted, Title VII would not require employers and
unions to hire and promote based on race. Only Congressman Celler's
remarks arguably address the scope of a court's remedial authority.
The remainder of the debate is unfocused; accusations of compulsory
racial balancing by the bill's opponents and denial by its supporters
are directed to the Civil Rights Bill's substantive effect, apart from
judicial enforcement. In other words, the comments, with the one
exception noted, revolve around the question: if enacted, will the
Civil Rights Bill require employers and unions to balance their
respective work force and membership to reflect a community's racial
composition?
225. Id. at 1518. Representative Celler made similar statements about the EEOC:
"It is likewise not true that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission would
have the power to rectify existing 'racial or religious imbalance' in employment by
requiring the hiring of certain people without regard to their qualifications simply
because they are of a given race or religion." Id.
226. See supra note 221.
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Senate consideration of the Civil Rights Bill took place in three
stages.227 The first stage involved the efforts of the bill's opponents
to have it referred to the Judiciary Committee. Not unexpectedly,
much of the debate focused on the bill's merits. 228 Due to that
Committee's open and notorious hostility to civil rights legislation,
a successful vote would have sounded the death knell for the Civil
Rights Bill.2 29 Defeat of this motion heralded phase two: the formal
debate on the bill's substance. The third phase consisted of the
debate on Senator Mansfield's cloture motion and the final debate
following cloture. The Senate's deliberations lasted sixty-three days,
during which time virtually all other Senate business was suspended.
Accusations similar to those raised in the House regarding racial
balancing were repeated in the Senate. For example, Senator Hill
castigated the bill for compelling "racial balance" and replacing the
principle of nondiscrimination with "preferential treatment." 230 Sen-
ator Robertson graphically emphasized these views, saying:
It is contemplated by this title that the percentage of colored and
white population in a community shall be in similar percentages
in every business establishment that employs over 25 persons.
Thus, if there were 10,000 colored persons in a city and 15,000
whites, an employer with 25 employees would, in order to over-
come racial imbalance, be required to have 10 colored personnel
and 15 white.2 1'
At least ten other Senators shared this view. 232
In response to Senator Robertson, Senator Humphrey had pub-
lished in the Congressional Record a Justice Department analysis of
227. See Vaas, supra note 192, at 443-57; see also United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 235-51 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228. Compare 110 CONG. REC. 5423, 6001 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)
with id. at 5092 (remarks of Sen. Robertson); id. at 5877-78 (remarks of Sen.
Byrd).
229. THE LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 200, at 11.
230. 110 CONG. REC. at 486-89 (1964).
231. Id. at 5092. Senator Humphrey was so incensed by these remarks that he
interrupted Senator Robertson to ingist "The bill does not require that at all. If
it did, I would vote against it .... There is no percentage quota." Id.
232. See, e.g., id. at 4764 (remarks of Sens. Hill and Ervin); id. at 5877-78
(remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at 7091, 9034-35 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); id. at 7774,
7778, 9034-35 (remarks of Sen. Tower); id. at 7878-79 (remarks of Sen. Russell);
id. at 8175, 8500 (remarks of Sen. Smathers); id. at 8500, 8618-19, 13,076 (remarks
of Sen. Sparkman); id. at 9943-44 (remarks of Sens. Long and Talmadge).
In responding to the claims of Senator Smathers, Senator Humphrey again said
"[t]here is no enforced quota. The quota system which has been discussed is
nonsense. Everyone knows that it is not in the bill .... " Id. at 6001.
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the bill, which asserted that "[tlhe bill would not authorize anyone
to order hiring or firing to achieve racial or religious balance." '233
When the opponents of Title VII published a newspaper advertise-
ment reiterating the same claims, Senator Humphrey emphatically
responded that Title VII did not "in any way authorize the Federal
Government to prescribe as the advertisement charges, a 'racial
balance' of job classifications or office staffs or 'preferential treat-
ment of minorities.' "234 He further stated "[Njothing in the bill
would permit any official or court to require any employer or labor
union to give preferential treatment to any minority group."235 While
superficially appealing to those who would limit a court's remedial
authority to "make-whole" relief for identified victims of discrim-
ination, Senator Humphrey's intertwining of racial balancing, pref-
erential treatment, and a court's authority weakens the force of this
statement.
At the end of the seventeen days of debate on the motion to
refer the Civil Rights Bill to the Judiciary Committee, the Senate
defeated the motion and considered the bill on the merits.116 The
debate's second stage occurred in two phases. Initially, the floor
leaders for the Democratic and Republican parties, Senators Hum-
phrey and Kutchel, respectively, discussed the bill's goals and scope.2 3 7
After their remarks, bipartisan "captains," working in teams, argued
separately in support of each title. Senators Case and Clark were
responsible for Title VII.238
Senator Humphrey's opening remarks touched upon the scope of
a court's remedial authority:
The relief sought in [a Title VII] suit would be an injunction
against future acts or practices of discrimination, but the court
could order appropriate affirmative relief, such as hiring or rein-
statement of employees and the payment of back pay .... No
233. Id. at 5094. The reference to "anyone" is unclear. The Justice Department
directed its analysis to the ten most common objections to Title VII, one of which
was that the statute authorized "federal 'inspectors' " to compel employers to hire
by race. Id. Its response to this objection was that "the Commission may take
its case to a Federal judge, leaving it to him to decide if a violation did in fact
take place and what the remedy should be." Id. "Anyone" most likely refers to
the "federal inspector" and the Commission rather than the court. Once again,
the confusion over "racial balancing" is self-evident.
234. Id. at 5423.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 6417; see Weber, 443 U.S. at 235 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vaas
supra note 192, at 443-44.
237. 110 CONG. REC. at 14,464.
238. 110 CONG. REC. 6528 (1964); Vaas, supra note 192, at 444-45.
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court order can require hiring, reinstatement, admission to mem-
bership, or payment of back pay for anyone who was not fired,
refused employment or advancement or admission to a union by
an act of discrimination forbidden by this title. This is stated
expressly in the last sentence of section 707(e) [subsequently enacted
as section 706(g)], which makes clear what is implicit throughout
the whole title: namely, that employers may hire and fire, promote
and refuse to promote for any reason, good or bad, provided only
that individuals may not be discriminated against because of race,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title,
there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission
or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees
in order to meet a racial "quota" or to achieve a certain racial
balance.239
Senator Humphrey's remarks reflected the same "violation/remedy"
confusion which characterized his earlier statement. While initially
his remarks appear emphatic, the language in the second- paragraph
referring to "racial balance" undercuts the first paragraph's strength.
The statements of the bill's Republican supporters, however, are
more precise than those of Senator Humphrey. Senator Kutchel, the
Republican floor leader for Title VII, said:
[T]he important point, in response to the scare charges which
have been widely circulated to local unions throughout America,
is that the court cannot order preferential hiring or promotion
consideration for any particular race, religion, or other group.
Its power is solely limited to ordering an end to the discrimination
which is in fact occurring.
2 40
239. 110 CONG. REc. at 6549. In concluding his speech Senator Humphrey struck
a similar theme. "It is claimed that the bill would require racial quotas for all
hiring, when in fact it provides that race shall not be a basis for making personnel
decisions." Id. at 6553.
240. Id. at 6563. In describing the Court's power, he said:
[ilf the court finds that unlawful employment practices have indeed been
committed as charged, then the court may enjoin the responsible party
from engaging in such practices and shall order the party to take that
affirmative action, such as the reinstatement or hiring of employees, with
or without back pay, which may be appropriate.
Id.
Senators Humphrey and Kutchel also co-authored a Bipartisan Civil Rights News-
letter. In Newsletter #28, they wrote: "[uinder title VII, not even a court, much
less the Commission, could order racial quotas or the hiring, reinstatement, admission
to membership or payment of back pay for anyone who is not discriminated against
in violation of this title." Id. at 14,465; see also Vaas, supra note 192, at 445.
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He also introduced a memorandum prepared by Republican House
members reflecting the same understanding.2 4'
After these openirfg remarks, the "floor captains" addressed Title
VII's merits. Their discussion, however, failed to make clear whether
they were addressing the scope of a court's authority following a
finding of liability or simply saying that racial imbalance did not
trigger a Title VII violation. Each Senator denied that Title VII
would require "racial balancing. 2 42 At Senator Clark's request, a
Justice Department memorandum was introduced as further evidence
of Title VII's limited scope:
[lit has been asserted title VII would impose a requirement
for "racial balance." This is incorrect. There is no provision,
either in title VII or in any other part of this bill, that requires
or authorizes any Federal agency or Federal court to require
preferential treatment for any individual or any group for the
purpose of achieving racial balance.2 43
While this document arguably was addressing a court's remedial
authority, the "Interpretative Memorandum" jointly submitted by
Senators Clark and Case clearly referred to the substantive issue of
whether racial imbalance per se would constitute a violation. 44 Also
introduced was a second document modeled on one discussed earlier
and fashioned in the style of "objections" and "answers" asserting
that quotas "are themselves discriminatory." 2 45
241. 110 CONG. REC. at 6565-66.
242. See id. at 7207 (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("The suggestion that racial balance
or quota systems would be imposed by this proposed legislation is entirely inac-
curate"); id. at 7253 (remarks of Sen. Case) (denying that the bill would require
racial hiring); see also id. at 13,080 (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("The bill does not
make anyone higher than anyone else. It establishes no quotas."); id. at 14,484(remarks of Sen. Moss) ("The bill does not accord to any citizen advantage or
preference-it does not fix quotas of employment . . .").
243. Id. at 7207. Other supporters of the bill made similar observations. See id.
at 9113 (remarks of Sen. Keating); id. at 9881-82 (remarks of Sen. Allott); id. at
10,520 (remarks of Sen. Carlson); id. at 11,768 (remarks of Sen. McGovern).
244.[l]f a business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has
an all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the employer's
obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory
basis. He would not be obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in
order to hire Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies ....
Id. at 7213. The Supreme Court has refused on at least one occasion, however to
give controlling weight to the Clark/Case memorandum. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1971); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 215 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
245. "Objection: The bill would require employers to establish quotas for non-
whites in proportion to the percentage of nonwhites in the labor market area.
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The filibuster on Title VII stretched out over two months. Again
and again opponents raised the specter of mandatory "racial bal-
ancing" in work places and unions. 246 Recognizing that their own
assurances were insufficient, the bill's proponents finally suggested
that an explicit disclaimer be inserted to allay their opponents'
fears. 247 Section 7030) was part of the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute
for the Civil Rights Bill.248
Answer: Quotas are themselves discriminatory." 110 CONG. REc. at 7218.
Other supporters of the bill repeatedly gave the same assurances. See, e.g., id.
at 9113 (remarks of Sen. Keating); id. (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 10,520
(remarks of Sen. Carlson); id. at 11,471 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id. at 11,768
(remarks of Sen. McGovern); id. at 11,848 (staff memorandum of Sen. Humphrey);
id. at 14,331 (staff memorandum submitted by Sen. Williams).
246. In many respects the filibuster lacked virtually all characteristics of a "dia-
logue." Rather than presenting an opportunity for open discussion, reflection and
persuasion, it often degenerated into pointless exchanges with each side resolutely
standing by its original position. For example, when Senator Robertson persisted
in claiming that H.R. 7152 would compel "percentage hiring," it fell to Senator
Humphrey to repeat still once more that this consequence could not flow from
the bill's enactment: "If the Senator can find in title VII . . . any language which
provides that an employer will have to hire on the basis of percentage or quota
related to color, race, religion, or national origin, I will start eating the pages one
after another, because it is not in there." Id. at 7420.
Ironically, in light of subsequent judicial opinions, Robertson replied, "I find
it in the possible ruling of a bureaucrat and then confirmed by a court that does
not operate in a way that I approve." Id. Barely controlling his sense of exasperation,
Humphrey retorted: "Mr. President, I enjoy these debates, because I know when
I engage in them with the Senator from Virginia, he becomes more eloquent,
moving, and persuasive every moment." Id.; see also id. at 5092 (similar dialogue).
Despite the adamant denials by the bill's supporters other senators repeated these
accusations. See, e.g., id. at 7778 (remarks of Sen. Tower); id. at 7800 (remarks
of Sen. Smathers).
247. Senator Humphrey first raised this possibility in an exchange with Senator
Smathers:
Mr. Humphrey[:] Would the Senator from Florida be more pleased if
we included in the bill an amendment which provided that there should
be no quota system?
Mr. Smathers[:] I think the bill would be improved.
Mr. Humphrey[:] That might be a good Amendment. It is only to satisfy
those who are doubters, because if we do not expressly provide for a
quota system, obviously it will not be included. But since we do provide
in other sections of the bill-for example, in title VI-that the withdrawal
of Federal funds should not relate to insured activities or guarantees,
we might very well want to include that sort of restraint in the bill.
I have heard this argument made again and again. If there is that legitimate
fear, which I do not see in the bill, but which others may see, perhaps
we ought to remedy the alleged defect. I do not believe in a quota
system.
Id. at 7800.
248. For a general discussion of the substitute bill, see Vaas, supra note 192,
at 446-47.
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The Dirksen-Mansfield bill was a compromise bill hammered out
behind the scenes by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Senators
Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey and Kutchel. In explaining its in-
clusion, Senator Humphrey said:
A new subsection 703(j) is added to deal with the problem of
racial balance among employees. The proponents of this bill have
carefully stated on numerous occasions that title VII does not
require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his
work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual or
group. Since doubts have persisted, subsection (j) is added to
state this point expressly. This subsection does not represent any
change in the substance of the title. It does state clearly and
accurately what we have maintained all along about the bill's
intent and meaning. 249
This statement, like so many others in the course of the debate,
also fails to distinguish between "remedies" and "violations." It
addresses employers, not courts.
On June 17, the Senate adopted Title VII by a vote of 73 to
27.250 Once again, the usual legislative procedures were not followed.
The two houses should have set up a conference committee to iron
out the bills' differences. Instead, the House voted directly on the
Senate version and, after one hour of debate, passed it by a vote
of 289 to 126.21 During the debate, three backers of the bill res-
urrected the charges of "racial balancing" and "quotas" for the
purpose of putting them to their final rest. Representative Lindsay,
one of the Act's key Republican supporters, said, "[W]e wish to
emphasize also that this bill does not require quotas, racial balance,
or any of the other things that the opponents have been saying
about it." ' 252 Representative MacGregor observed:
249. 110 CONG. REC. at 12,723.
The court shall not find, in any civil action brought under this title,
that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful em-
ployment practice charged in the complaint solely on the basis of evidence
that an imbalance exists with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national orgin [sic]
employed by any employer ...in comparison with the total number or
percentage of such persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in any community, state, section or other area ... without support-
ing evidence of another nature that the respondent has engaged in or is
Id. at 9881-82.
The amendment may have been intended to have "remedial" motives as well.
Senator Allott said the amendment grew out of his and Senator Humphrey's
opposition to "quotas." Id. at 8618.
250. Id. at 14,511.
251. Id. at 15,893.
252. Id. at 15,876.
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Important as the scope and extent of this bill is, it is also vitally
important that all Americans understand what this bill does not
cover.
Your mail and mine, your contracts and mine with our consti-
tuents, indicates a great degree of misunderstanding about this bill.
People complain about . . . preferential treatment or quotas in
employment. There is a mistake belief that Congress is legislating
in these areas in this bill. '
Representative McCulloch offered assurances that "[t]he bill does
not permit the Federal Government to require an employer or union
to hire or accept for membership a quota of persons from any
particular minority group."254
With these three remarks, the legislative circle was closed precisely
at the point where it began. Congressional supporters remained as
confused as they were one year and thirteen days before, when the
Civil Rights Bill was introduced.
Two observations emerge clearly from the tortured days of debate.
First, Congress intended, as it spelled out in section 703(j), that
Title VII not require "any employer . . . to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group"2 5 for
the purpose of creating racial balance in the employer's work force.
In other words, since racial imbalance did not constitute a violation
of Title VII, neither a federal "inspector" nor a court possessed
the authority to order quota-based hirings or promotions to create
a balance. Second, while section 706(g), on its face, appeared to
restrict a court's authority to ordering relief for identified victims
who were "refused admission, suspended, or expelled [from a union]
or . . . refused employment or advancement or . . . suspended or
discharged . . . on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... ,"256 the comments of the bill's supporters in both houses
left the meaning of that section far from settled.
V. The Legislative History of the 1972 Amendments
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII in several significant respects,
most of which are not directly pertinent to this discussion. 2 7 One
253. Id. at 15,893.
254. Id.
255. 78 Stat. 257 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982)).
256. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
257. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972) (codified at and amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). The
most radical change involved the expansion of the authority of the EEOC. Under
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amendment, however, does merit analysis. That amendment, as il-
lustrated by the italicized language, modified the language of section
706(g) to authorize a court to order "such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay ...
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. ' 258 By
inserting this language Congress clearly intended "to give the courts
wide discretion . . . to fashion the most complete relief possible. '259
The sponsors of the amendment specifically emphasized the need
for comprehensive "make-whole" relief for actual victims. 26° No-
where, however, did they express the view that such relief excluded
race-conscious remedies for non-victims. Indeed, their rejection of
three other amendments supports a contrary conclusion.
The first of these rejected amendments was introduced by Con-
gressman Erlehorn to severely limit the use of class actions in Title
VII cases. The implications of that proposal and its defeat are
discussed separately. 26'
The second and third rejected amendments would have barred
both the judicial and executive branches from ordering race-conscious
relief for non-victims. To appreciate the significance of these pro-
posals some background information must be supplied. In 1965,
the 1964 Act, the EEOC had no independent litigative authority. The 1972 amend-
ment authorized the agency to bring suit in its own name directly against employers
in cases involving individual instances of discrimination and in "pattern and practice"
cases. Id. at 105 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(1982)). The Attorney General,
however, retained the exclusive jurisdiction to bring suit against a state government,
governmental agency or political subdivision. Id. A second radical change consisted
of broadening the scope of the Act's coverage by including federal employees and
employees of state and local governments. Id. at 104-05 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-5(c), 2000e-16 (1982)). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1972).
258. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added).
259. 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972).
260. The purpose of the amendment was explained as follows:
The provisions of this subsection are intended to give the courts wide
discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete
relief possible. In dealing with the present section 706(g) the courts have
stressed that the scope of relief under that section of the Act is intended
to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the
attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the
particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires
that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful
employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where
they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.
Id.
261. See infra notes 311-13 and accompanying text.
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President Johnson issued an executive order 62 which made broad
findings of race and sex discrimination in the construction industry.
To remedy what was essentially societal discrimination similar to
that which later prompted Congress to include the ten percent set-
aside for minority businesses in the Public Works Employment Act
of 1977,263 the order required federal contractors to establish af-
firmative action programs containing "goals" for minority employ-
ment. 261
Prior to the debate on the 1972 amendments, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit had rejected a multi-pronged attack on this
executive order, made in the context of a challenge to the "Phil-
adelphia Plan. 2 65 It specifically held that the restrictive language
of Section 7030) did not apply to actions taken under the executive
order.266 The court's decision caused considerable consternation among
the Congressmen opposed to all forms of race-conscious relief. These
Congressmen focused their attention on two issues. First and foremost
was the fundamental question of the propriety of such relief. The
debate on this issue principally pitted Senator Sam Ervin, a vigorous
opponent of racial preferences, against Senator Jacob Javits, the
floor-manager of the proposed bill. Their exchanges centered on the
philosophical and legal justifications for employment preferences
based on race. 267
262. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted
as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). See generally K. McGUINESS, PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT IN EMPLOYMENT (1977); Jones, Jr., Twenty-one Years of Affirmative
Action: The Maturation of the Administrative Enforcement Process Under the
Executive Order 11,246, as amended, 59 CHI-KENT L. REV. 67 (1982); Lenhoff,
Voluntary Affirmative Action and the Office of Federal Contract. Compliance
Programs, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 762 (1981); Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive
Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1971); Note, Executive Order 11,246 and
Reverse Discrimination Challenges: Presidential Authority to Require Affirmative
Action, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 376 (1979); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study
in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 723 (1972).
The use of "affirmative action" to remedy employment discrimination has its
genesis in Executive Order 10,925 issued by President Kennedy in 1961. Exec. Order
No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961). It mandated that all contracts entered into
by the federal government contain the following language: "The contractor will
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees
are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin." Id. It was later amended to include discrimination on the basis of
sex. Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,375 (1967).
263. See supra text accompanying note 155.
264. See supra note 262.
265. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
266. Id.
267. 118 CONG. REC. 1662-76 (1972) (passim).
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The second and more subtle issue reflected the unavoidable and
ever present tension between the legislative and executive branches.
Several Congressmen were disturbed because they read the Third
Circuit's decision as permitting the executive branch to impose quotas
via the "back door" after Congress had deliberately barred the front
door in section 703(j). 268
Senator Ervin first proposed an amendment that read,in part: "No
department, agency, or officer of the United States shall require an
employer to practice discrimination in reverse by employing persons
of a particular race ... in either fixed or variable numbers, pro-
portions, percentages, quotas, goals, or ranges. ' ' 269 He made it per-
fectly clear that the Philadelphia Plan was the target of his amendment,
although he drafted the amendment in the broadest terms possible
in order to include all government agencies. 270
Senator Javits spoke out forcefully against the proposal."' He
stated that a vote for the amendment would result in dismantling
the executive order and "deprive the courts of the opportunity to
order affirmative action under title VII of the type which they have
sustained in order to correct a history of unjust and illegal dis-
268. Id. at 1662-63. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 at 1525-26 (1972).
269. 118 CONG. REC. at 1662 (Amendment 829) (1972).
Representative Dent proposed a similar amendment in the House to "forbid the
EEOC from imposing any quotas or preferential treatment of any employees in
its administration of the Federal contract-compliance program." 117 CONG. REC.
at 31,784 (1971). The amendment was directed to the EEOC rather than the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance ("OFCC") because the bill then under consideration
contemplated the transfer of that agency's jurisdiction to the EEOC. In Repre-
sentative Dent's view, there was no need to extend the amendment to the courts'
remedial authority since "[sluch a prohibition against the imposition of quotas or
preferential treatment already applies to actions brought under title VII." Id. The
House never voted on Dent's amendment because a substitute bill was adopted
which did not transfer the OFCC's jurisdiction.
270. 118 CONG. REC. at 1663.
271.
[T]he depth of this amendment is much greater than is apparent on the
surface because it would purport not only to inhibit in given respects
the officers of the United States but also the courts of the United States
through whom, once they make a finding or a judgment, the officers
of the United States are moved.
I make that analysis because it is clear that what is sought to be reached
is, first the Philadelphia plan and similar plans in other cities, and beyond
that, the whole concept of "affirmative action" as it has been developed




crimination .. ".. 112 To emphasize this point he had printed in the
Congressional Record both the Third Circuit's opinion and a decision
by the Ninth Circuit affirming the imposition of race-conscious relief
for non-victims. 273 In addition, Senator Javits referred to two consent
judgments only recently obtained by the Department of Justice
authorizing such relief. 7 In commenting upon them, he said:
[This amendment] would torpedo orders of courts seeking to
correct a history of unjust discrimination in employment on racial
or color grounds, because it would prevent the court from ordering
specific measures which could assign specific percentages of mi-
norities that had to be hired, and that could apply to government
as well as private employers .... 271
Clearly, in Senator Javits' view, Title VII authorized the imposition
of race-conscious relief irrespective of the context in which the remedy
was fashioned, i.e., a judgment entered after a trial or a judgment
entered upon the parties' consent. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
in Stotts intimates that this distinction may prompt a different
result .276
Arguments similar to those made by Senator Javits were also made
by Senator Williams, who said that the amendment would effectively
"strip title VII . . . of all its basic fiber. It can be read to deprive
even the courts of any power to remedy clearly proven cases of
discrimination . . . . [It] raises the real threat of destroying any
potential for effective law enforcement." 27 7 Significantly, Senator
Ervin never disputed his opponents' description of the reach of his
proposed amendment.
The Ervin amendment was defeated by a margin of two to one.2 78
Undaunted, Senator Ervin proposed a second amendment extending
section 703(j)'s prohibition against racial preferences to "Executive
Order Numbered 11246, or any other statute or executive order. 2 79
After a brief debate, it too was resoundingly defeated. 280
272. Id. at 1665 (emphasis added).
273. Id. at 1665-75 (reprinting Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), and United States v.
Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971)).
274. Id. at 1675.
275. Id.
276. 104 S. Ct. at 2594 n.3; see also id. at 2605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice White disagrees. Id. at 2587 n.9.
277. 118 CONG. REC. 1676 (1972) (emphasis added).
278. Id. at 1676 (44 nays and 22 yeas).
279. Id. at 4917-18.
280. Id. at 4918 (60 nays, 30 yeas).
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Coupled with the amendment to section 706(g) emphasizing the
broad scope of a court's remedial authority, the Senate's rejection
of these amendments strongly suggests Congress' approval of ju-
dicially imposed race-conscious relief for non-victims. 28'
This conclusion, moreover, is reinforced by the report of the
Conference Committee which accompanied the 1972 amendments.
"In any area where the new law does not address itself, or in any
area where a specific contrary intention is not indicated, it was
assumed that the present case law as developed by the courts would
continue to govern the applicability and construction of Title VII."L " 8
It should be noted, in passing, that Justice White, writing for the
majority in Stotts, rejected any argument based on the sponsors'
expressed intention in amending section 706(g).283 He correctly de-
scribes their purpose as encouraging the courts to award "make-
whole" relief to the actual victims of employment discrimination. 28 4
What he fails to appreciate, however, is that such relief does not
contradict or undercut the viability of race-conscious remedies for
non-victims. There is nothing inherently inconsistent between the
two forms of relief. Indeed, it is more logical to assume that in
rejecting the Ervin amendments the Senate was showing its approval
of the courts' adoption of race-conscious relief, but in amending
section 706(g) it was expressing its disapproval of their too limited
relief to actual victims.
While none of the foregoing is conclusive, the legislative history
of the 1972 amendments shows Congress' awareness of the imposition
of race-conscious remedies benefiting non-victims by both the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches. In light of the highly controversial
nature of such relief, Congress' silence and its outright refusal to
act is best interpreted as confirmation that sections 706(g) and 7030)
do not preclude such preferential relief.
281. Relying in part on this same legislative history, Justice Brennan observed
in Bakke: "Executive, judicial, and congressional action subsequent to the passage
of Title VII conclusively established that the Title did not bar the remedial use of
race." 438 U.S. 265, 353 n.28 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Ironically, Justice White, the author of the majority opinion in Stotts,
joined in Justice Brennan's opinion.
282. 118 CONG. REc. at 7166. Significantly, Senator Williams and Congressman
Perkins, managers of the 1972 bill amending Title VII, had the Conference Com-
mittee Report containing this language inserted in Senate and House volumes of
the Congressional Record. Id. at 7166, 7564.




VI. The Court's Endorsement of Rule 23(b)(2) Certification and
the Use of Statistical Evidence
A. Class Actions
That racial discrimination is essentially a group wrong, collective
in nature, finds support in the procedural mechanism most frequently
used in litigating disparate treatment and adverse impact cases: class
certification pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 285 When Title VII cases first began to reach the courts,
285. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) 'there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members
of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions with respect to individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class
as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning
the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(a)-(b).
The relationship between Title VII and Rule 23 has been a fertile field for legal
scholars. Some of the more stimulating recent articles include: Bridgesmith, Rep-
resenting the Title VII Class Action: A Question of Degree, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
1413 (1980); Greene, Title VII Class Actions: Standing at Its Edge?, 58 U. DET.
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it was frequently observed that "[r]acial discrimination is by defi-
nition class discrimination. 28 6 In the years that followed, the courts
did not distinguish between the substance of a Title VII claim,
discrimination against a class, and the procedural device used to
press the substantive claim, Rule 23. Their lack of precision fostered
an uncritical approval of most class action allegations.
Although the Supreme Court has since condemned such routine
certifications, it has in the same context acknowledged that racial
discrimination is by definition a group wrong. 287 Given this ac-
knowledgment, denying a court the authority to impose a group
remedy seems highly unreasonable. This is not to say that Congress
could not deny a court such authority; having the power to create
the right, it certainly is free to frame the remedy. However, in light
of the Court's jurisprudence of affirmative action as reflected in
Bakke, Weber and Fullilove, and in light of the legislative history
of the 1964 Act and the 1972 amendments, the Court's interpretation
of section 706(g) appears even more strained when viewed against
its pronouncements concerning the application of Rule 23 to Title
VII. As demonstrated below, the use of a "class" procedure to
establish a "class substantive" claim further illustrates the propriety
of relief for non-victims of discrimination.2 88
Congress did not, at the time of the statute's enactment, foresee
J. URB. L. 645 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Greene]; Karro, The Importance of
Being Earnest: Pleading and Maintaining a Title VII Class Action for the Purpose
of Resolving the Claims of Class Members, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 904 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Karro]; Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L.
REV. 688 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rutherglen]; Warren, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Class Action Litigation, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 1206 (1982).
286. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); accord
Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local No. 30, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333
(9th Cir. 1977) ("[s]ince the purpose of Title VII is to eliminate ... class based
discrimination, class actions are favored in Title VII actions for salutary policy
reasons"); Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976)
("[blecause [Title VII] attacks class-based discrimination, it is particularly appropriate
that suits to remedy violations of the Act be brought as class actions"), aff'd sub
nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Senter v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976)
("[rlace discrimination is peculiarly class discrimination"); Barnett v. W. T. Grant
Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[v]iewed broadly, Barnett's suit is an
'across the board' attack on all discriminatory actions by defendants on the ground
of race, and when so viewed it fits comfortably within the requirements of Rule
23(b)(2)"); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir.
1970) ("The very nature of a Title VII violation rests upon discrimination against
a class characteristic, i.e., race, religion, sex or national origin").
287. See infra notes 315-37 and accompanying text.
288. Id.
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the important role class actions were to play in Title VII litigation.
Although the Act authorized the Attorney-General to file "pattern
and practice" suits,289 it did not contain an analogous procedure
for private actions. While Congress clearly anticipated the important
role of the private plantiff, 290 it did not analyze in any detailed
manner the mechanism of this aspect of the statute's implementa-
tion. 29' Its silence is in part attributable to the then pervasive dis-
satisfaction with the rule governing class actions, dissatisfaction which
prompted its amendment in 1966. In 1964, Rule 23 was bogged
down in ephemeral distinctions among "true," "hybrid" and "spu-
rious" classes and was not operating efficiently. 292 The new rule
abandoned this scheme altogether; it explicitly recognized as appro-
priate for class action treatment cases in which "the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class." ' 293 The Rule's commentators, in describing the kinds
of cases appropriate for certification under this subsection, said:
"[illlustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually
one whose members are incapable of specific enumeration. ' 294
From both the plaintiff's and defendant's perspective, the advan-
tages of class action certification are significant. In Title VII actions,
as in other kinds of litigation, the class action device avoids multiple
suits and eliminates judicial and administrative waste. It fashions a
vehicle whereby individuals with small dollar claims can obtain
289. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707, 78 Stat. 253, 261-
62 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982)).
290. Thus, Congress provided for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing
party, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(k), 78 Stat. 253, 261
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982)), and for the appointment of an attorney
for the charging party and a waiver of fees, costs and security. Id. § 706(e), 78
Stat. 253, 260 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982)).
291. Interestingly, Congress refused to permit the filing of class claims with the
EEOC. The House bill originally authorized private individuals to file charges "on
behalf of" discriminatees. The Senate, however, deleted the language. 110 CONG.
REC. at 8193 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirkson); id. at 7217 (remarks of Sen. Clark);
Vaas, supra note 191, at 446-47, 452-53; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259. In 1972 Congress reversed itself. Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 103, 104
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982)).
292. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), the first
reported Title VII class action, was decided under the original Rule 23.
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
294. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note to 1966 Amendment, subd.
(b)(2) [hereinafter cited as Adv. Comm. Notes]; accord, Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(I), 81 HARv. L. REV. 356, 389 (1967).
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judicial redress which would otherwise be unavailable. 295 It binds
not only the specific parties to the action, but also absent class
members. 296 Additionally, certain claims common to many Title VII
suits, such as challenges to height and weight requirements, testing
procedures, and subjective promotion decisions, lend themselves to
class action treatment.2 97
Almost without exception, the courts heeded the commentators'
suggestion and certified Title VII class actions pursuant to subsection
(b)(2). 298 In so doing they treated the employees' demand for mon-
etary relief, generally in the form of back pay, as "ancillary" to
the prayer for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. 299 There was no
ceiling to this "ancillary" relief, of course, and it could amount to
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and thereby dramatically affect
the employer's financial well-being. 3°°
The courts were quick to seize on the concept of discrimination
as inherently class-based, and therefore, they demanded far less of
295. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 1782,
at 101-02 (1972) and at 127-29 (1985 Supp.).
296. 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.60 (2d ed.
1985) [hereinafter cited as MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, 1789, at 171 (1972).
297. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-32 (1977) (height and
weight requirements); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (em-
ployment tests); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (same).
298. See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Larson, 554 F.2d 868, 874-75 (8th Cir.
1977); Cross v. National Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (6th Cir.
1977); Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 919 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); Society for
Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 339-42 (10th Cir. 1975); Barnett v. W. T.
Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 508 F.2d 239, 250-53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Jenkins
v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-35 (5th Cir. 1968); Note, Antidiscrimination
Class Actions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of
Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868 (1979); see MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 296, at 1 23.50.
299. E.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 251-52 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); accord Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282,
1295-96 (8th Cir. 1979); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211,
256-58 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); Head v. Timken Roller
Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 802-04 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1969).
300. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court
said: "given a finding of unlawful discrimination, back pay should be denied only
for reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory
purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons
whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421 (footnote
omitted). Consequently, the lower courts rarely deny back pay relief.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Title VII plaintiffs by way of conformity with Rule 23's requirements30'
than they did of plaintiffs pressing other types of claims.3 2 This
double standard prompted harsh criticism in academic circles, but
the courts were not without defenders.303 The courts often justified
this less than rigorous scrutiny by pointing to the possibility of
decertification3' as a basis for granting class action status to Title
VII claims. 305 The scope of the class certified, moreover, was fre-
quently so broad as to be omnivorous. 3°6 Representation was not
301. Requirements are of typicality and numerosity among others. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23.
302. For example, the requirements of Rule 23 are applied more demandingly
by the courts to shareholders in Rule lOb-5 actions. Gert v. Elgin Nat'l Indus.,
Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159 (7th Cir. 1985); Eisenberg and Nissen v. Gagnon, 766
F.2d 770, 784-85 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
303. Compare Karro, supra note 285, at 904-05; Meyers, Title VII Class Actions:
Promises and Pitfalls, 8 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 767, 788 (1977); Smalls, Class Actions
Under Title VII: Some Current Procedural Problems, 25 Am. U.L. REV. 821, 874
(1976); Comment, The Proper Scope of Representation in Title VII Class Actions:
A Comment on East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 13 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 175, 197-99 (1978) with Connolly & Connolly, Qualifying Title
VII Class Action Discrimination Suits: A Defendant's Perspective, 9 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 181, 212-13 (1977); Greene, supra note 285, at 648-49; Miller, Class Actions
and Employment Discrimination Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
43 Miss. L.J. 275, 280-85 (1972); Shawe, Processing the Explosion in Title VII
Class Action Suits: Achieving Increased Compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a), 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 517-18 (1978).
304. Rule 23(c)(1) permits conditional certification and authorizes the court to
alter or amend the order certifying the class "before the decision on the merits."
FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1); see Adv. Comm. Notes, subd. (c)(l) supra note 294; Stastny
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273-76 (4th Cir. 1980); Scott v.
University of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 85 n.18 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979).
See generally MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 296, at 23.50.
305. See Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657
F.2d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); Stastny v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 628 F.2d 267, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1980); Scott v. University
of Del., 601 F.2d 76, 85-88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); cf.
Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553 F.2d 714, 719-20 (1st Cir. 1977) (analyzing the
advantages of maintaining a Title VII action as a class action rather than decer-
tifying).
306. See United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 862-63
(8th Cir. 1978) (all past, present and future women employed by the defendant at
any of its offices in the United States and all past, present and future female
applicants for employment at any of the defendant's offices in the United States),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 582 F.2d
827, 828 (3d Cir. 1978) (all past, present and future black employees and applicants
for employment); Williams v. TVA, 552 F.2d 691, 693 (6th Cir. 1977) (all blacks
presently employed by the TVA or formerly employed and presently laid off);
Wilson v. Allied Chem. Corp., 75 F.R.D. 45, 47 (E.D. Va. 1977) (all past, present
and future female employees). Ultimately, the class certification was denied, 456
F. Supp. 249, 256 (E.D. Va. 1978); cf. Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 707-
08 (5th Cir. 1973) (Godbold, J., dissenting), rev'd en banc per curiam on other
grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
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limited to a single facility operated by the defendant or integrally
related employment practices. Class action plaintiffs often challenged
the defendant's alleged discriminatory conduct at multiple sites3°7
and in all aspects of its operations3' 0 and at all levels of employ-
ment. °9 These sweeping attacks quickly earned the sobriquet of
"across-the-board" complaints.3 0
If the courts entertained any doubts about the propriety of class
actions in Title VII litigation, these doubts were laid to rest by the
1972 amendments. The House version of the proposed bill amending
Title VII specifically restricted the use of class actions."' The Senate,
however, apparently prompted by the position of the Department
307. See, e.g., United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 585 F.2d at 862 ("at any
of its offices in the United States"); Penn, 490 F.2d at 707-08 (seventeen federal
agencies operating in Alabama).
308. See, e.g., Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 468, 471 (D. Colo.
1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975) (hiring, training,
and employment practices).
309. See, e.g., Dickerson, 582 F.2d at 828-29; Wilson v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
75 F.R.D. 45, 47 (E.D. Va. 1977).
310. See, e.g., Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). It has been defined "as permitting any person 'claiming to be aggrieved by
any particular discriminatory employment practices of an employer alleged to be
part of an overall pattern of class based discrimination to sue to end all forms
of discrimination by that employer against the class.' " Id. at 628-29 (emphasis
added) (quoting Groves v. Insurance Co. of North Am., 433 F. Supp. 877, 883(E.D. Pa. 1977)); cf. Gramby v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 84 F.R.D. 655, 659
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (approving an across-the-board class at a single facility but dis-
approving it for multiple situs).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is the principle architect of "across-
the-board" class certifications. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969); Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.
1968); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). It has
played a critical role in fostering an expansive interpretation of Title VII's scope
and remedies. Its leadership in this area parallels its leadership in compelling
desegregation. See generally C. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT: SOUTHERN
FEDERAL JUDGES AND BLACK VOTERS (1973); J. PELATSON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY
MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961); F. READ &
L. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP
SOUTH (1978); J. WILKINSON, FROM Brown TO Bakke 111-18 (1979).
Most circuit courts of appeals favored the Fifth Circuit's "across-the-board"
approach. See, e.g., Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1372-73
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 553
F.2d 714, 719 (1st Cir. 1977); Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local
No. 30, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1977); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
522 F.2d 333, 339-42 (10th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d
721, 723 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Hackett v. McGuire Bros.,
Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446-47 (3d Cir. 1971).
Many scholars, however, were less accepting. See supra note 303 and accompanying
text; see also Rutherglen, supra note 285, at 724-40.
311. H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(e) (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 92d Cong., 2d
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of Justice, rejected this restriction.312 In approving a provision per-
mitting the administrative filing of charges "by or on behalf of a
person claiming to be aggrieved," it noted that "[tihis section is
not intended in any way to restrict the filing of class complaints.
The committee agrees with the courts that Title VII actions are by
their very nature class complaints, and that any restriction on such
actions would greatly undermine the effectiveness of Title VI." 31 3
Treating the legislative history of the 1972 amendments as an
explicit endorsement by Congress of a liberal approach to class
certification, the courts continued to approve "across-the-board"
class action complaints.114 The broad sweep of these complaints was
cut short, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in East Texas
Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez."5 In that case, three
Mexican-American employees of a trucking company filed a com-
plaint challenging both the employer's refusal to transfer them from
their position as "city drivers" to "line drivers" and the employer's
seniority system.31 6 Despite the complaint's class action allegations,
Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972
at 147 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; see Sape & Hart,
Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 824, 841-45 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sape & Hart].
312. See Sape & Hart, supra note 311, at 841-45.
313. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1971) (footnote omitted), reprinted
in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 311, at 436. Interestingly, the footnote
cited Crown Zellerbach Corp. and United Gas Corp., two seminal "across-the-
board" actions decided by the Fifth Circuit. See supra note 308 and accompanying
text. During the Senate debate on the proposed amendments Senator Williams
observed:
[Ilt is not intended that any of the provisions contained therein are
designed to affect the present use of class action lawsuits under Title
VII in conjunction with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The courts have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims under
Title VII involve the vindication of a major public interest, and that
any action under the Act involves considerations beyond those raised by
the individual claimant. As a consequence, the leading cases in this area
to date have recognized that Title VII claims are necessarily class action
complaints and that, accordingly, it is not necessary that each individual
entitled to relief under the claim be named in the original charge or in
the claim for relief.
1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 311, at 1847 (remarks of Sen. Williams). He
made a similar remark in the course of analyzing the conference committee bill.
118 CONG. REC. at 7168 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); accord id. at 7565 (remarks
of Rep. Perkins), reprinted in 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 311, at 1847.
314. For cases specifically citing the legislative history for support of "across-
the-board" allegations, see, e.g., Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d
650, 662-64 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (Hufstedler, J., concurring); Williams v. TVA,
552 F.2d 691, 696-97 (6th Cir. 1977); Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's
Union, 549 F.2d 1330, 1333-34 (9th Cir. 1977).
315. 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
316. Id. at 398-400.
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they failed to move for certification and limited their proof at trial
to the plaintiffs' individual claims.3"7 The district court dismissed
the class action claims and ruled against each plaintiff on the merits. ' 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
dismissal of the class action claims, holding it was the responsibility
of the district court, not the parties, to initiate a class action
determination. 3 9 The appellate court thereupon certified the class
and ruled in the plaintiff-class's favor on the basis of proof offered
during the trial of the individual plaintiffs' claims.120 To say the
least, the Fifth Circuit's opinion pushed the scope of class relief to
its outermost limits.32 ' Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court vacated
the judgment since the trial court had determined that the plaintiffs
"were not members of the class of discriminatees they purported to
represent. 3 22 The Court sternly admonished the court of appeals,
insisting "[als this Court has repeatedly held, a class representative
must be part of the class and 'possess the same interest and suffer
the same injury' as the class members." '323
The majority of the lower courts, not without some reluctance,
interpreted Rodriguez as squarely undercutting the "across-the-board"
class action complaint.324 A few courts and at least one commentator,
however, read Rodriguez as doing no more than rejecting "an extreme
application of the presumption in favor of certification. 3 25 For our
purposes, however, the importance of Rodriguez lies in the Court's
express acknowledgment that the discrimination proscribed by Title
VII is inherently class discrimination. "We are not unaware that
317. Id. at 399-400.
318. Id. at 400.
319. Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 49-50 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
320. Id. at 52-60.
321. Greene, supra note 285, at 680.
322. 431 U.S. at 403.
323. Id. (citations omitted).
324. See, e.g., Stastny v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 273 n.7
(4th Cir. 1980); Doninger v. Pacific Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1312 (9th
Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Allied Chem. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 249, 254 (E.D. Va. 1978);
Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 189, 198, 201 (D. Md. 1978);
Carpenter v. Herschede Hall Clock Div., Arnold Indus., 77 F.R.D. 700, 701 (N.D.
Miss. 1977).
325. Rutherglen, supra note 285, at 723; see, e.g., Ford v. United States Steel
Corp., 638 F.2d 753, 761 n.22 (5th Cir. 1981); Scott v. University of Del., 601
F.2d 76, 86-88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Alexander v. Aero
Lodge No. 735, 565 F.2d 1364, 1373 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946
(1978); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 61-62 (E.D. Pa.
1977), vacated sub. nom. Worthy v. United States Steel Corp., 616 F.2d 698 (3d
Cir. 1980); cf. Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 565 F.2d 895, 900 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 835 (1978) (certifying a sweeping "across-the-board" class
without any mention of Rodriguez).
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suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very
nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. 3 26 Rodriguez stands
solely for the proposition that lower courts must insist on compliance
with the procedural rule governing the maintenance of a Title VII
class action claim. In no way does the opinion disagree with the
substantive characterization of the claim as consisting of "classwide
wrongs. "
The validity of this view is reinforced by the Supreme Court's
holding in General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon.3 27
In that case, the plaintiff challenged his employer's denial of a
promotion on the grounds that he was discriminated against because
he was of Mexican-American origin.32 He claimed that his employer's
"employment, transfer, promotional, and seniority system" adversely
affected Mexican-Americans as a class.3 29 The complaint contained
no factual allegations respecting the employer's hiring practices.
Nonetheless, the district court, in a pre-trial order, certified an
"across-the-board" class, consisting of Mexican-Americans who had
applied for employment but who had not been hired.330 The issues
for resolution at trial thus revolved around the impact of the em-
ployer's hiring and promotion practices both on Falcon individually
and the class he represented. 3 ' With respect to Falcon's individual
claims, the district court held that he failed to establish liability as
to the employer's hiring practices, but established liability as to its
promotion practices. Finding liability as to hiring practices, but no
liability as to promotion practices, the district court reached the
opposite result regarding the class action claims 3 2 On appeal, the
employer attacked the class certification, arguing that Falcon could
not represent both employees and persons seeking employment.33
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding of disparate
treatment in promotion but held that the plaintiff had not met his
burden of proof in establishing disparate impact in hiring.13 4 Relying
on Rodriguez the Supreme Court reversed, holding the district court's
certification of the plaintiff-employee as a representative of a class
alleging discrimination in hiring violated the strictures of Rule 23.115
326. 431 U.S. at 405.
327. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
328. Id. at 149.
329. Id. at 150-51 n.l.
330. Id. at 152 n.5.
331. Id. at 152.
332. Id.
333. 626 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1980).
334. Id. at 369-82.
335. 457 U.S. at 156-61.
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It vigorously cautioned against permitting a Title VII plaintiff to
cast a wide net in drafting class action allegations.33 6 Once again,
however, the Court resoundingly affirmed its earlier jurisprudence
concerning the class nature of discrimination. " '
In sum, although at first glance the Court's narrowing of the
circumstances under which class action certification is appropriate
might be interpreted as indicating a more conservative approach to
the substance of Title VII, an analysis of Rodriguez and Falcon shows
the Court to be concerned only with assuring adherence to the
procedural requirements of Rule 23. No one can argue that, standing
alone, the Court's comments in these cases seriously undercut its
dicta in Stotts limiting the scope of remedies available under section
706(g). The willingness of the Court to recognize the group character
of racial discrimination in this context, however, reveals that the
issue of race-conscious relief is not as open and shut as Stotts
suggests.
B. The Use of Statistical Evidence
Statistical evidence has come to play as key a role in Title VII
litigation as it has in class actions. Class actions and statistical
evidence, moreover, are firmly coupled. Although on occasion sta-
tistics can establish a prima facie case in disparate treatment " or
adverse impact339 cases brought on behalf of an individual, they are
"the crucial form of evidence" in class actions.
40
336. Id. at 156.
337. "We cannot disagree with the proposition underlying the across-the-board
rule-that racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination." Id. at 157
(footnote omitted).
338. See, e.g., Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Kinsey
v. First Regional Sec. Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kaplan v. I.A.T.S.E.,
Local 659, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Hudson v. IBM, 620 F.2d
351, 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980); Harper v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1975) ("statistics may not be a deter-
minative factor in an individual, as opposed to a class action, discrimination case
... [but] they may often be probative and supportive of an individual employee's
allegation that an employer has discriminated against him or her on impermissible
grounds"); King v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 523 F.2d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 1975)
("statistical evidence of a pattern or practice of discrimination is of probative value
in an individual discrimination case for the purpose of showing motive, intent, or
purpose ... [but] it is not determinative of an employer's reason for the action
taken against the individual grievant") (quoting Terrell v. Feldstein Co., 468 F.2d
910, 911 (5th Cir. 1972)).
339. See, e.g., Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys. Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir.
1981); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1258-59 (6th Cir.
1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1018 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403
(C.D. Cal. 1970), modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
340. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 11. For an exhaustive analysis of
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In a disparate treatment class action, statistics are used to establish
and/or rebut the claim of a racially-based employment practice or
policy. 41 In an adverse impact class action, statistics are generally
the only means available to analyze the effect of the challenged
practice or policy on a protected group.3 42 Underlying the coupling
of the class action and statistical evidence is the implicit recognition
that Title VII focuses on groups, not individuals. Both suggest that
the nature of the wrong lies in an employment practice or policy
specifically directed toward, or adversely impacting upon, a protected
group. The individual suffers solely because he or she is a member
of the group.
The reason the focus of Title VII litigation has expanded from
the "individual" mentioned in the statute itself 343 and in the legislative
history,344 to the "group," is attributable to a more precise under-
standing of the nature of employment discrimination.
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a
series of isolated and distinguishable events, for the most part
due to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual or
organization.... Experience has shown this view to be false.
Employment discrimination as viewed today [1972] is a far more
complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the
subject now generally describe the problem in terms of "systems"
and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs, and the
the use of statistics in Title VII cases, see id. at 1331-91 and CONNOLLY & PETERSON,
USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION (1985). Especially useful in
the latter text is an extensive bibliography identifying and briefly describing articles
and books on statistics in employment discrimination litigation. CONNOLLY & PE-
TERSON, USE OF STATISTICS IN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY LITIGATION B-1 to B-27 (1985).
341. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); Falcon
v. General Tel. Co. of Southwest, 626 F.2d 369, 380 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450
U.S. 1036 (1981), on remand, 647 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
342. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (national statistics as
to comparative height and weight of men and women used to show that Alabama
statute requiring all prison guards to meet minimum weight requirement of 120
pounds and minimum height requirement of five feet two inches would exclude
over 4007o of female population but less that 1% of male population); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (validation study to determine whether
employment test was discriminatory); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (statistical evidence used to show lack of correlation between job performance
and educational and test score requirements for employment). It has been observed
"[tihat the use of statistics remains the dominant method of establishing a prima
facie adverse impact case." SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at 152 (2d ed.
Supp. 1983).
See generally Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection
Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis under Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1977).
343. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (b), (c), -3(a) (1982).
344. See supra notes 196, 208 and accompanying text.
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literature on the subject is replete with discussion of, for example,
the mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation
of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory practices through
various institutional devices, and testing and validation require-
ments.345
Because statistics so readily lend themselves to an examination of
"systems" and easily reveal the similarities and differences among
classes of people, they are invaluable tools to both plaintiffs and
defendants. Thus, as frequently observed "[in cases concerning racial
discrimination, 'statistics often tell much and Courts listen'. 3 46
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze any specific issue
involved in use of statistics in Title VII cases. The purpose here is
simply to show how wholeheartedly the Supreme Court has endorsed
their use and to question whether the Court has fully understood
the implication of its endorsement.
The first significant case involving statistical evidence to reach the
Court was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.347 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger accepted without reservation the statis-
tical evidence introduced by the plaintiffs which consisted primarily
of census data and black/white passing rates on general intelligence
tests.3 48 These statistics constituted the basis for his conclusion that
the defendant's diploma and test requirements constituted " 'built-
in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability. 3 49 The opinion did not, however, address the the-
oretical underpinnings for the admission of evidence.
The Court remained silent concerning the role of statistical evidence
in Title VII until 1977, when it pointedly addressed this issue in
three near unanimous opinions, each of which was written by Justice
Stewart 50
345. S. REP. No. 91-1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970); see also S. REP. No.
92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971). See generally Blumrosen, Strangers In Paradise:
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972).
346. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970)
(quoting Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam,
371 U.S. 37 (1962)).
347. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). All the members of the Court joined in the Chief
Justice's opinion except Justice Brennan who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. Given Justice Brennan's liberal approach to Title VII litigation
in general and his position in subsequent cases involving statistics, it is quite obvious
that he endorses the Chief Justice's reliance on generalized statistics.
348. Id. at 430 n.6.
349. Id. at 432 (emphasis added).
350. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,351 the
employer challenged the lower court's reliance on statistical evidence
as proof of discrimination in a "pattern or practice" suit brought
by the Attorney General. Although the Court acknowledged that
this evidence was supplemented with the testimony of individuals
who brought "the cold numbers convincingly to life, 35 2 the opinion
wholeheartedly endorsed the Government's use of statistics. It point-
edly commented that " '[s]tatistical analyses have served and will
continue to serve an important role' in cases in which the existence
of discrimination is a disputed issue." '353 In part, the employer based
his challenge on section 703(j), contending that the use of statistics
was improper since Title VII specifically stated that an employer is
not required to maintain a racially balanced work force. Although
the Court acknowledged the validity of the employer's interpretation,
it firmly rejected the employer's proffered conclusion. 54
The Court's endorsement of statistical evidence, however, was
tempered by its warning: "[wie caution only that statistics are not
irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind
of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends
on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. '
Having endorsed their use in general, the Court next confronted
the issue of which types of statistics were relevant. In Dothard v.
Rawlinson,35 6 a female applicant for a prison guard position intro-
duced "national statistics" to challenge the state employer's height
and weight requirements. Reaffirming its observations in Teamsters,
the Court approved their use because there was "no reason to suppose
that the physical height and weight characteristics of Alabama men
and women differ markedly from those of the national popula-
tion." 37
On the same day that Dothard was decided, however, the Court's
words of caution in Teamsters bore fruit. Hazeiwood School District
v. United States38 was also a "pattern or practice" suit brought by
the Attorney General, alleging that the school district unlawfully
denied employment to black teachers. In reversing the district court's
judgment in favor of the defendant, the Court of Appeals for the
351. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
352. Id. at 339.
353. Id. (quoting Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equity League, 415 U.S.
605, 620 (1974)).
354. Id. at 339-40 n.20.
355. Id. at 340.
356. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
357. Id. at 330; see id. at 337-40 (Rehnquist, J., concurring.)
358. 433 U.S. 299 (1977); 534 F.2d 805, 810-13 (8th Cir. 1976).
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Eighth Circuit had placed great reliance on statistics, comparing the
number of black teachers employed by the school district and the
number of black teachers in the relevant labor market, including
the neighboring St. Louis School District.359 That district had un-
dertaken a very aggressive policy of recruiting to maintain a fifty-
fifty black/white teacher ratio.3 60 Citing Teamsters the Court en-
dorsed, in principal, the court of appeals' analysis of the comparative
work force statistics. 6' However, it vacated the appellate court's
finding of Title VII liability and remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings because of (1) the possibility that the
inclusion in the labor pool of St. Louis School district distorted the
statistics and (2) the appellate court's failure to perform a separate
statistical analysis of the district's hiring of black teachers, after
1972, the year the district became subject to Title VII. 62
Hazelwood's emphasis on the need for refined rather than gross
statistics makes sound practical sense. In no way does it qualify or
condition the Court's general approval of this kind of evidence.3 63
Once again Justice Stewart's opinion for the majority, insofar as it
touched upon the use of statistics, received unanimous approval by
the other members of the Court.316
As noted earlier, the problem alluded to in Stotts arises with
respect to the benefits awarded in class actions and pattern or practice
suits to individuals who are unable to prove that they suffered from
specific acts of discrimination. 65 The majority opinion in Stotts
suggests that section 706(g) prohibits relief for these "non-victims. 3 6
The incongruity between the statistical evidence of discrimination
established at trial and a court's ability to remedy it is self-evident.
In such a Title VII case, the plaintiff would have demonstrated a
359. 534 F.2d 805, 810-13 (8th Cir. 1976).
360. 433 U.S. at 303.
361. Id. at 307-08.
362. Id. at 308-13.
363. Unfortunately, it has also caused Title VII cases to "develop into 'contests
between college professor statisticians who revel in discoursing about advanced
statistical theory' and propounding increasingly complex statistical models." EEOC
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 645 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting Otero v. Mesa
County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, 470 F. Supp. 326, 331 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 628 F.2d
1271 (10th Cir. 1980)), rev'd sub nom, Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S.
867 (1984).
364. Only Justice Stevens dissented in Hazelwood. But he did so, in part, on
the grounds that the statistics demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 314-20 (1977) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
365. See supra text accompanying note 95.
366. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90; cf. id. at 2592-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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statutory violation by offering "nameless, faceless," non-indivi-
dualized proof. The trial court, however, would be powerless to
order hiring or promotion relief to counterbalance the employer's
wrongful conduct vis-a-vis the group at which it was directed. The
incongruity heightens if the judgment is one entered upon consent.
If an employer becomes convinced, based on statistical evidence
unearthed during the discovery process, that he is treating a class
of employees differently based on their race or that he has adopted
a practice or policy which adversely impacts minority-employees,
why should he be precluded from remedying the wrong by advan-
taging the injured group? The incongruity becomes intolerable when
it is recalled that under Weber the same statistical evidence would
be sufficient to justify a private affirmative action program under
both Justice Brennan's "traditionally segregated job category" test
and Justice Blackmun's "arguable violation" test.3
67
In sum, in interpreting section 706(g) to preclude hiring or pro-
motion relief for non-victims, the majority in Stotts failed to see
the inexorable link between the nature of the substantive violation,
on the one hand, and the class action device and statistical evidence,
on the other. These key procedural and evidentiary mechanisms,
which play such a significant role in employment discrimination
litigation, point directly to the "group" character of a Title VII
injury. Denying a "group" remedy is both unseemly and nonsensical.
VII. "Group" Interest, A Jurisprudential Overview
As indicated earlier, the purpose of this article is to express serious
reservations about whether the dicta in Stotts are correct in limiting
a court's authority to award race-conscious relief to non-victims.
An in-depth analysis of the jurisprudential considerations supporting
such relief is beyond the scope of this article. A brief overview will
be provided, however, to show that they are not insubstantial.3 68
Only recently have courts and legal commentators perceived
"groups" as being competent to enter the legal arena and demand
relief. Roscoe Pound characterized legally cognizable claims as fur-
thering "individual," "public" or "societal" interests. According to
367. See supra notes 114-18, 124-28, 134-35 and accompanying text.
368. In addition to the sources cited in notes 4 and 104 supra, see generally EQUALITY
AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT (M. Cohen, T. Nagel and T. Scanlon, eds. 1977);
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (B. Gross ed. 1977); J.C. FOSTER, ELUSIVE EQUALITY:
LIBERALISM, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (1983). For an
extended discussion of the jurisprudence of group interests and Title VII, see
Blumrosen, supra note 45.
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Pound, an interest is "a demand or desire which human beings
either individually or in groups seek to satisfy, of which, therefore,
the ordering of human relations in civilized society must take ac-
count." '369 Individual interests are self-explanatory; public interests are
the "demands or desires involved ... in a politically organized society,
asserted in title of political life . . . ;" social interests are "those
wider demands or desires involved in . . .social life in civilized society
and asserted in title of social life." 370 In other words, the legal system
was a boxing arena of sorts whose featured bouts promoted contests
among these competing interests. Pound's neat vision depended in
large measure on an extremely broad vision of "society." Analytically,
it was telescopic rather than microscopic in range.
Prompted in part by the impact of the New Deal's economic
legislation, technological advancements, and the civil rights move-
ment, groups having interests distinct from those of individuals and
society began to spring up, taking on a force and vitality of their
very own. In 1958, Professor Cowan proposed modifying Pound's
theory and introducing the concept of "group" interest. " ' The concept
rested on Cowan's observation that "[m]odern life is lived associ-
atively. The new democracy is an aggregation of sub-groups, not
primarily of individuals." 3 72
Brown v. Board of Education3 73 was the quintessential group
interest litigation. Brown was not a case about particular black
369. R. POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 96 (5th ed. 1943)
[hereinafter cited as POUND]. For a provocative linking of Pound's interpretation
of equality and class actions in Title VII, see Greene, supra note 285, at 698.
370. POUND, supra note 369, at 97.
371. " 'By group interests,' I mean interests urged, not in the name of individuals
nor of society as a whole, but in the name of what sociologists call 'secondary
groups'-associations, unions, societies, clubs, boards, councils, professions." Cowan,
Group Interests, 44 VA. L. REV. 331 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cowan]; see also
Cowan, The Impact of Social Security on the Philosophy of Law: The Protection
of Interests Based on Group Membership, 11 RUTGERS L. REV. 688 (1957). See
generally A Symposium on Group Interests and the Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 427
(1959). Cowan's prescience is startling. He clearly foresaw the conflict inherent in
reverse discrimination. "Individual interests, to be preserved, must increasingly array
themselves against group interests." Cowan, supra, at 331. For criticism of the
"group" theory, see Cowan, Inverse Discrimination, 33 ANALYSIS 10, 12 (1972);
Goldman, Limits to the Justification of Reverse Discrimination, 3 Soc. THEORY &
PRAC. 289 (1975); see also Taylor, Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice,
33 ANALYSIS 177 (1973). See generally Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context:
Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866-67 (1977).
372. Cowan, supra note 371, at 331. For an interesting application of Cowan's
theory to procedure, see Note, Antidiscrimination Class Actions Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: The Transformation of Rule 23(b)(2), 88 YALE L.J. 868,
885-88 (1979).
373. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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students' right to attend an integrated school. What triggered the
decision was the impact of segregation on black students in general. 74
The strongest influences on the Court were the sociological studies
referred to in famous footnote 11.315 As Professor Fiss, in his seminal
article on structural reform, so aptly observed,
The victim of a structural suit is not an individual, but a group.
In some instances the group is defined in terms of an institution:
the inmates of the prison or welfare recipients. Or the victim may
consist of a group that has an identity beyond the institution: in
a school desegregation case, for example, the victims are not the
pupils, but probably a larger social group, blacks. In either in-
stance, it is important to stress two features of the group. First,
it exists independently of the lawsuit; it is not simply a legal
construct. Wholly apart from the lawsuit, individuals can define
themselves in terms of their membership in the group, and that
group can have its own internal politics, struggles for power, and
conflicts. Secondly, the group is not simply an aggregation or
collection of identifiable individuals . . . . The group exists, has
an identity and can be harmed, even though all the individuals
are not yet in being and not every single member is threatened
by the organization. 76
374. See generally Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidis-
crimination Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1974); Greenberg, Race Relations and Group Interests in
the Law, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 503 (1959); Horowitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown
and the Dilemma of Liberalism, 14 HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979).
375. 347 U.S. at 494.
376. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreward: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1979) (footnotes omitted). See generally Fiss, A Theory of
Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 240-44 (1979).
Professor Brodin makes a similar point in arguing against the application in Title
Vii cases of the causation principle enumerated in Mt. Healthy City School District
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In his view, such an application rests
on two highly dubious assumptions. The first is that title VII's only goal
is compensating "victims"; the second is that the only concerned parties
in a title VII action are the plaintiff and defendant at bar. The result
is a formulation that confuses the issue of defining a violation with the
very separate issue of fashioning appropriate relief.
The first assumption flies in the face of congressional and judicial
pronouncements that the primary objective (or at least one primary
objective) of title VII is the elimination of discrimination in employment
opportunities. With this deterrence goal in mind, why should a plaintiff
be required, in order to establish a violation, to go beyond proving that
race or another forbidden criterion was a motivating factor in the de-
cision? ...
The second assumption that seems to underlie the Mt. Healthy con-
struct-that the court need concern itself only with the equities running
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If Brown represents the judicial embodiment of Cowan's theory,
then certainly the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents the legislative
embodiment. A purer "group" statute cannot be found. The for-
midable task the legislators set for themselves was to improve the
political, educational, and economic rights of blacks. "Improve" in
this context is too mild a word-"radicalize," "revolutionize" would
be far more accurate. Congress intended nothing short of a restruc-
turing of American life (Pound's "society") to accommodate the
moral demands of blacks (Cowan's "group"). 3 77
As noted earlier, the courts have only to look to the complete
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to realize that in enacting
Title VII Congress made the same kind of finding of pervasive
discrimination in employment that the Supreme Court accepted in
Fullilove as a constitutional precedent for the ten percent set-aside,
a paradigmatic form of group relief.3 78 The long and the short of
the matter is that blacks were being denied equal employment op-
portunities and that Congress intended to outlaw practices precluding
their full participation in the labor force. That the Supreme Court
has suffered from tunnel vision in its interpretation of Title VII is
partially the fault of the legal environment in which many members
of the Eighty-eighth Congress were raised. Cowan's extension of
Pound's theory of interests was in its infancy in 1964. The legislators'
repeated references to "individuals" (which the Court found so
persuasive in Stotts) reflects the infirmities of their legal vocabulary.
The concept of "group" rights had not filtered from the halls of
academia to the floor of Congress.3 79
Related to this paucity of vocabulary is the problem of statutory
interpretation itself. As noted earlier, there are no House, Senate
between the parties at bar-overlooks the fact that "claims under Title
VII involve the vindiction of a major public interest." The statute was
enacted against a background of hundreds of years of racism and racial
violence and represents a congressional determination that continued
discrimination in employment is against the public interest. In focusing
solely on the impact of discrimination on the litigant who has chosen
to challenge it, the same-decision standard represents "an- attempt to
individualize or personalize an evil or wrong that is basically an insti-
tutional wrong." Congress has relied primarily on private litigants for
the judicial enforcement of title VII, thus imbuing these private actions
with a social function unaddressed by the Mt. Healthy theory of causality.
Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 317-20 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 157, 173; infra text accompanying note 392.
379. Employment After Weber, supra note 116, at 3, 13.
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or Joint Committee reports dealing with Title VII.380 The courts
have relied principally on the comments of individual Congressmen
during the Senate debate on cloture or the debates in both Houses
on the Civil Rights Bill itself. This "hunt and pick" method, however,
distorts the sense of Congress' purpose. It ignores the numerous
committee proceedings and hearings which laid the groundwork for
the statute's enactment. It ignores the general unrest sweeping the
country as civil rights marchers demanded "deliberate speed" now.
It ignores the brutality of the white segregationist response. And
perhaps most seriously of all, it ignores the impact of television,
which each evening brought these troubling events into the homes
of most Americans.381
The 1964 Act was not a routine statute whose genesis can be
traced to a particular Congressman or triggering event. Preceding
the introduction of the Civil Rights Bill was a massive compendium
of studies, data, and testimony detailing the political and economic
plight of blacks. Overlooking these materials in favor of exchanges
on the House and Senate floor distorts the statute's legislative history.
While there were many references during the debates to Title VII's
protection for individuals, these other materials clearly show a broader
Congressional intent: the individuals merited relief precisely because
they were members of a group against whom a grievous injustice
had been perpetrated.182
380. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93, 202-54.
381. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 12, at vii; THE LONGEST DEBATE, supra note
200, at xviii-xix.
382. See supra notes 196, 208 and accompanying text; see also Blumrosen, supra
note 45, at 120-21. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), may represent the
apogeosis of the Supreme Court's protection of the "individual" under Title VII.
In that case, Connecticut, in selecting employees for promotion to a supervisory posi-
tion, required the candidates to pass a written test. Id. at 443. Although the test clearly
had a disparate impact judged by the standards the Supreme Court laid down in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975), the percentage of minority employees promoted exceeded by
far the percentage of white employees promoted. 457 U.S. at 444. Thus, the
"bottom line" result of the promotional process produced an appropriate racial
balance despite the disparate impact of one of its component parts. In a 5-4 decision
the Supreme Court held that a racially balanced "bottom line" did not preclude
employees from establishing a prima facie case, nor did it provide a defense to
such a case. Id. at 442. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennan hinged his
opinion on Congress' intent to protect individuals from " 'built-in headwinds,'
id. at 448, a phrase borrowed from Griggs.
Section 703(a)(2) prohibits practices that would deprive or tend to deprive
"any individual of employment opportunities." [§ 703(a)(2) 79 Stat. 255, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)]. The principal focus of the statute is the
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The circumstances under which the House and Senate exchanges
were uttered discounts their value as well. It is particularly unfair
to give overriding consideration to the remarks in debates. While
many of them were undoubtedly carefully thought out before being
uttered, many others were simply part of the political hurly-burly.
In most instances it is difficult, if not impossible, to discern between
the two.
Three theories have been advanced to justify- the awarding of
benefits to members of disadvantaged groups who themselves were
not specific victims of discrimination: compensatory justice, distrib-
utive justice and social utility. 8 3 As its name suggests, compensatory
justice is designed to "make-whole" discriminatees by putting them
protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of the
minority group as a whole. Indeed, the entire statute and its legislative
history are replete with references to protection for the individual em-
ployee. See, e.g., §§ 703(a)(1), (b), (c), 704(a), 78 Stat. 255-57, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (b), (c), 2000e-3(a) [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2(a)(1), (b), (c), 2000e-3(a)]; 110 CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (interpretive
memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case) ("discrimination is prohibited
as to any individual"); id., at 8921 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("Every
man must be judged according to his ability. In that respect, all men
are to have an equal opportunity to be considered for a particular job").
Id. at 453-54 (emphasis in original).
The "line up" of the Justices in Teal is curious. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, Stevens and White formed the majority block. Id. at 441. Justice White's
position in Teal is, of course, consistent with his opinion in Stotts, limiting Title
VII relief to actual victims of discrimination. 104 S. Ct. at 2588-90. Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun have a more complex view of Title VII, however, than
Justice White. In Teal, they are emphasizing the individual's right to relief in the
absence of a "bottom-line" injury to the group. 457 U.S. at 453-56. In Stotts,
they argue that Title VII commends relief for members of the group as well as
individual victims. 104 S. Ct. at 2605-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Powell,
Burger, Rehnquist and O'Connor, who had joined in Justice White's opinion in
Stotts, look to the disparate impact of challenged tests on the group in Teal. 457
U.S. at 456-64 (Powell, J., dissenting). Finding "no adverse effect on the groun."
they conclude that "Title VII has not been infringed." Id. at 460 (Powell, J.,
dissenting), The practical effect of disregarding a "bottom line" defense clearly
troubled the dissenting Justices, who foresaw two impediments to Title VII resulting:
first, to avoid spending large sums of money to validate tests, a difficult process
in itself, an employer might resort to quota hiring; and second, an employer might
manipulate its hiring and promotion decisions to reflect the percentage of minorities
in the labor pool, thereby actually decreasing the number of minorities otherwise
in its work force. Id. at 463-64. These same Justices, however, seem indifferent
to the argument that the practical effect of Stotts is to discourage settlements. See
supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
383. For an extended analysis of these three theories, see Nickel, Preferential
Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
534 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Nickel]. Professor Nickel's analysis is reexamined
in Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Duncan].
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where they would have been absent the offending conduct. The
Supreme Court has never disputed the validity of "make-whole"
relief. Indeed, subject to a few limiting caveats to protect the vested
interests of white employees, the Court has consistently insisted that
Title VII demands "make-whole" relief for actual victims. 3 84 This
is the precise message of the majority opinion in Stotts.3 85
Theoretically, however, there is no need to limit compensatory
justice to actual victims. Where the fabric of society is woven in
such a manner that all members of the group have suffered injury
solely by virtue of their membership, then the theory of compensatory
justice demands remedial awards without the traditional elements of
proof associated with an adversary system. It is this theory that
underlies Justice Marshall's separate opinion in Bakke. "It is un-
necessary in 20th century America to have individual Negroes dem-
onstrate that they have been the victims of racial discrimination;
the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless
of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact." 386 Justice
Stevens, although dissenting on the merits, wholeheartedly embraced
its validity in Fullilove, stating that in Justice Marshall's "eloquent"
separate opinion in Bakke he "recounted the tragic class-based dis-
crimination against Negroes that is an indelible part of America's
history. I assume that the wrong committed against the Negro class
is both so serious and so pervasive that it would constitutionally
justify an appropriate class wide recovery measured by a sum certain
for every member of the injured class."3 7
384. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
364-65 (1977); see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 236-40 (1982).
"Make-whole" relief, which has also been called "restorative justice," does not
confer benefits because of race; it confers them because a legally cognizable wrong
was committed. The wrong triggering the need for the remedy was based on race.
See Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination
Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 431-34 (1980); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
419-22 (1975).
385. Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2588-90 (1984).
386. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978); Duncan,
supra note 381, at 511-20; see Bayles, Compensatory Reverse Discrimination in
Hiring, 2 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE '301 (1973); Blackstone, Reverse Discrim-
ination and Compensatory Justice, 3 Soc. THEORY AND PRAC. 265 (1975); Nagel,
Equal Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 Pn. & PUB. ATE. 348, 357
(1973); Sher, Justifying Reverse Discrimination in Employment, 4 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 159, 164 (1975); Taylor, Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice,
33 ANALYSIS 177, 179 (1973). But see Nickel, supra note 381, at 538; Nickel, Should
Reparations be Paid to Individuals or to Groups?, 34 ANALYSIS 154, 160 (1974).
387. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring)).
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In contrast to compensatory justice, which (as Justices Stevens
and Marshall suggest) focuses on the past wrongs perpetrated on
the group, distributive justice emphasizes the present effect of the
past wrong.3"' It can be argued that the decisions and actions
prompting the defendants' conduct in Bakke, Fullilove and Weber
represent a form of distributive justice because, in each instance the
entity conferring the benefit intended to contribute to the eradication
of the present effect of discrimination.38 9 In Bakke, the Board of
Regents was attempting to increase the number of minority physicians
by accepting applicants who, because of the vestiges of racism in
education, were unable to compete unassisted for the limited number
of seats available in medical schools.3 90 In Weber, the employer was
similarly seeking to overcome educational deficiencies resulting from
a segregated school system which left minority workers without the
skills necessary to hold craft positions.3 91 In Fullilove, Congress had
determined that minority contractors were foreclosed from govern-
ment contracts because of the pervasive effect of racism in the
construction industry.3 92 Advocates of the distributive theory of jus-
tice ask whether there exists a continuing deprivation of equal op-
portunity. 93 An affirmative answer justifies the distribution of benefits
according to race.
The social utility theory takes an approach quite different from
the theories just discussed. Based on arguments developed by Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, it judges the value of affirmative
action by its impact on society as a whole. 94 Proponents of this
388. Duncan, supra note 380, at 521. Several courts in approving quotas or
goals benefitting individuals who were not actual victims of discrimination have
adopted the rationale that such action is necessary to eradicate the "present effects"
of discrimination. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 328-
31 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
389. See generally B. BITTAKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); Bayles,
Reparations to Wronged Groups, 33 ANALYSIS 182 (1973); Hughes, Reparations for
Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1968).
390. See supra notes 154-59, 165, 169-70 and accompanying text.
391. 443 U.S. at 212 n.*, 214-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see supra notes 119-23
and accompanying text.
392. See 448 U.S. at 460-68; supra note 157 and accompanying text.
393. See Duncan, supra note 381, at 528. See generally Rawls, Distributive Justice,
in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 58 (P. Laslett & W.G. Runciman, eds.
1967); Rawls, Distributive Justice: Some Addenda, 13 NAT. L.F. 51 (1968) (sup-
plementing the distributive justice theory).
394. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1876); J.S. MILL, Utilitarianism, in SELECTION OF ESSAYS BY MILL
(P. Wheelwright ed. 1935). See generally Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action
and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974); Nickel, Discrimination and
[Vol. XIV
AFFIRMA TIVE ACTION
theory advance three arguments to support affirmative action pro-
grams: first, it develops role models who, in turn, inspire educational
and economic advancement by other group members; second, it
exposes members of the majority group to vicarious experiences
otherwise denied to them; and third, it may result in the delivery
of better services to minority neighborhoods, as many minority
professionals and blue and white collar workers are likely to return
to these communities to establish their careers.3 9 In the proponents'
view, the overall benefits to society as a whole outweigh any in-
dividual instances of injustice or hardship which occur to members
of the majority group by operation of the affirmative action program.
If "groups" are a legally cognizable entity existing apart from
the individuals who make up their membership and from society,
and if a coherent theory of justice compels the granting of relief
to such groups, the question which obviously follows is what feature
characterizes the group to the exclusion of other groups also de-
manding relief. Congress answered the question in Title VII itself:
race. The predominant, if not exclusive, concern of Congress in
enacting Title VII was the political and economic plight of blacks.
Morally Relevant Characteristics, 32 ANALYSIS 113 (1972). The theories of com-
pensatory and distributive justice can be traced to Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, THE Ni-
CHOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book Five (D.P. Chase trans. 1911).
395. See Duncan, supra, note 381, at 525-28. See generally Nagel, Equal Treatment
and Compensatory Discrimination, 2 Pit. & PUB. AFF. 348 (1973). One justification
offered by the Davis Medical School for its decision to reserve 16 out of 100
places exclusively for minority students was increasing the number of physicians
practicing in minority communities. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 306 (1978). Significantly, Justice Powell did not flatly reject thisjustification as constitutionally insufficient to support an equal protection analysis.
He rejected it because of the paucity of data in the underlying record to support
the University's argument. Id. at 310-11. Justice Powell did flatly reject Davis'
alleged right of "countering the effects of societal discrimination." Id. at 306 n.43.
His rejection was grounded on two objections: first, to implement a race-conscious
remedy there must be a finding of discrimination by a competent judicial, legislative
or administrative tribunal and the Board of Regents was not so qualified; and
second, the disadvantages imposed by such a system on innocent third parties were
too severe. Id. at 309-10.
Justice Powell accepted the second argument described in the text, however,
because he agreed that the University's need for a "diverse student body" was a
compelling state interest sufficient to withstand a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at
311-15. Of course, in the long run, he voted with the "Stevens" group to invalidate
the Davis program; but his vote was prompted by the fact that he found that the
"means" used by the Board of Regents (i.e., a strict racial quota) did not fit the
state's interest tightly enough. Id. at 315-19.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), Justice Powell seemed to ac-
knowledge the constitutional validity of all three arguments, at least when they are
offered to justify congressional legislation employing race-conscious criteria. Id.
at 497, 499-500, 502-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Congress was not unmindful of the pervasive discrimination in Amer-
ican society against other racial groups and against women. That
discrimination, however, was not its overriding motivation. As has
been observed, "[t]he historical fact is ... that Title VII never
would have been passed without notice of the obvious state of affairs
that black people, specifically, were systematically prevented from
participating usefully and gainfully in our culture. 3 96 Of course,
the fact that Congress' attention was riveted on blacks does not
threaten Title VII's protection of other groups. Fullilove teaches that
the Court regards the selection of particular ethnic groups and of
women for government benefits as a political decision which is
virtually non-reviewable. 97
396. Schatzki, supra note 103, at 56. Similarly, Professor Belton has commented,
"[ilndeed, it is probable that in the absence of the historical mistreatment of blacks,
Congress would not have perceived a need for Title VII or similar civil rights
statutes at all." Belton, supra note 116, at 596.
There is universal sentiment among proponents of group relief that at a minimum
blacks, by virtue of this country's history of slavery and segregation, are entitled
to compensation. Duncan, supra note 381, at 511; see also Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976).
397. The bubble of non-reviewability surrounding such congressional decisions
could easily be burst, however, if Congress conferred benefits on a group not
generally acknowledged to have suffered from pronounced and pervasive discrim-
ination, such as Scandanavians, Italians, or Irishmen. See generally Boyd, supra
note 116, at 52-58; Kitch, The Return of Color-Consciousness to the Constitution:
Weber, Dayton and Columbus, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979).
For arguments supporting relief for women, the American Indians and the racial
groups selected by Congress in Fullilove, see Duncan, supra note 381, at 546-47
& nn. 137-39.
Ironically, Title VII's inclusion of women as a protected group resulted from
the attempts of Southern Congressmen to defeat the bill. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-
84 (1964); Vaas, supra note 192, at 441-42; THE LONGEST DEBATE, supra note 200,
at 115-18. During the course of amending Title VII in 1972 it was observed:
While some have looked at the entire issue of women's rights as a
frivolous divertissement, this Committee believes that discrimination against
women is no less serious than other prohibited forms of discrimination,
and that it is to be accorded the same degree of concern given to any
type of similarly unlawful conduct. As a further point, recent studies
have shown that there is a close correlation between discrimination based
on sex and racial discrimination, and that both possess similar charac-
teristics. Both categories involve large, natural classes, membership in
which is beyond the individual's control; both involve highly visible
characteristics on which it has been easy to draw gross, stereotypical
distinctions. The arguments justifying different treatment of the sexes
were also historically used to justify different treatment of the races
[D]espite the effort by the courts and EEOC, discrimination against
women continues to be widespread; and is regarded by many as either
morally or physiologically justifiable.
SEN. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, S. REP. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 416-17.
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In sum, as this brief overview suggests, granting relief to non-
victims of employment discrimination rests on three solid jurispru-
dential concepts of justice. Correcting the racial imbalance in a work
force resulting from an employer's discriminatory conduct furthers,
rather than frustrates, Congress' intent to bring blacks as a group
into the political and economic mainstream.
VIII. Conclusion
Very few topics have generated more controversy at every level
of American society than the use of race as a selection criterion in
hiring and promotion decisions. While most courts, scholars, and
members of the public at large acknowledge the fairness of pref-
erences for individuals specifically subjected to an employer's dis-
criminatory conduct, that unanimity dissolves if the preferences are
extended to non-victims. In Stotts, the Supreme Court suggested
that Title VII prevents a court from awarding a preference to non-
victims either as part of a consent judgment or as part of a judgment
entered after a trial on the merits.
The Stotts dicta are seriously flawed and merit reconsideration.
The 1964 legislative history which Justice White, author of the
majority opinion found so persuasive, cannot support the great weight
which he and Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion attach to
it. It is incapable of answering the question whether a court can
impose such a preference under Title VII because neither the statute's
supporters nor its opponents anticipated the inquiry. The 1972
Amendments are more helpful, although clearly not dispositive, since
Congress firmly rejected Senator Ervin's two attempts to prevent
the courts from awarding preferences to non-victims.
The answer to the question lies in the "spirit of Title VII" which
animated Justice Brennan's opinion for the majority in Weber,
sustaining the legality of such a preference contained in a private
voluntary agreement. It is hard to imagine that "spirit," motivated
by Congress' goal of bringing blacks into the mainstream of American
society, withholding from the courts the precise power it conferred
on private individuals. Such a denial makes neither legal nor political
sense. It also contradicts common sense because it discourages black
employees and applicants from suing while encouraging employers
to litigate, a result clearly at odds with Congress' repeatedly expressed
purpose of encouraging voluntary settlements.
The "spirit" of Title VII, moreover, has taken a procedural and
evidentiary substance through the class action device and the use of
statistics to establish a prima facie case. Their key role in the
development of Title VII jurisprudence has demonstrated that em-
19861
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
ployment discrimination is inherently a group wrong. Viewed from
this perspective, the distinction between a "victim" and a "non-
victim" breaks down. A "victim" is merely a member of the group
fortunate enough to be able to demonstrate that the employer was
specifically aware of his existence. A "non-victim" is unable to
make this showing. Of course, if the non-victim's existence had
come to the employer's attention, he too would have received the
same discriminatory treatment for the same reason-his membership
in the group. The employer's discrimination has nothing to do with
the "individual;" it has everything to do with the "group."
The employer stands to benefit from his own wrongdoing, more-
over, if a court is unable to order hiring preferences for non-victims.
The employer who discards applications after a month as "inactive,"
the employer who recruits through word-of-mouth, and the employer
who keeps scanty records of promotion or transfer requests, can
maintain a work force with insignificant minority participation long
after he is ordered to stop discriminating. In an industry or estab-
lishment where there is little employee turn-over, the projected date
by which the employer's work force will reflect the racial composition
of the appropriate labor pool is likely to be so far in the future
as to render it meaningless. Even if identified victims can be located,
a variety of personal considerations may prompt them to turn down
an offer of employment. For example, their present position may
pay more, be situated in a more accessible location or have greater
potential for advancement. Many of them may refuse simply because
they were victims of the employer's original discrimination and are
fearful of thrusting themselves into a hostile environment.
The Stotts dicta, when viewed in light of these practical consequences
totally devitalizes Title VII. Their effect is to discourage settlement,
encourage litigation and dishearten potential Title VII plaintiffs, con-
sequences completely frustrating Congress' expressed intent in enact-
ing Title VII.
In sum, the "spirit" which motivated Weber is the same "spirit"
which prompted the members of the Eighty-eighth Congress in 1964
to begin the long overdue task of bringing blacks into the mainstream
of American life. In Stotts, the Court drained the "spirit" from
Title VII by fashioning dicta whose legal reasoning is faulty and
whose vision is benighted.
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